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Abstract
Since the 1950s, armed conflicts have become more and more recurrent. Most con-
flicts occur in countries where incomes are heavily dependent on the agricultural
sector. This dissertation aims to systematically investigate the interconnection be-
tween agriculture, income and conflicts.
The first chapter is the introduction of this dissertation. Background informa-
tion about conflicts is provided in this chapter. In particular, we offer statistical
evidence about the quantity of conflicts, distribution of conflicts in terms of time
and location and the number of deaths as the result of these conflicts. This back-
ground information is important for understanding the severity of conflicts and the
significance of reducing them.
The second chapter is the overview chapter. The purpose of the overview chapter
is to provide a literature review about the interrelationship between agriculture,
income and conflicts. In this overview chapter, we start our discussion about how
conflicts can hinder economic development emphasizing the importance of studying
conflicts. We also discuss the development of conflict-related studies in the literature,
estimation methods and potential issues when researchers attempt to investigate the
effect of income variations on conflicts. We then end this chapter by analyzing the
role of agriculture, especially the impact of agricultural productivity on conflicts.
The third chapter is the main study in this dissertation and is about estimating
the effect of rainfall shocks on conflicts. We thoroughly examine the results on the
negative relationship between rainfall shocks and conflicts in African countries from
Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004). We consider the role of data revision and
cross-sectional dependence in their estimation. We find that the negative relation-
ship between rainfall shocks and conflicts in Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004)
is not valid when the revised rainfall and conflicts datasets are used in their esti-
mation. However, we propose a new estimator that is able to take cross-sectional
dependence arising from spatially-dependent weather patterns and cross-border con-
flict spillovers into account to examine the link between rainfall shocks and conflicts.
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Using this new estimator, we find that rainfall variations are indeed a determinant
of conflicts.
The fourth chapter is another main study and examines the effects of productivity-
enhancing technology in agriculture on conflicts. We consider the commercial le-
galization of Genetically-Modified (GM) soybean cultivation in Brazil in 2003 and
investigate the effects of GM soybean cultivation on land conflicts in Brazil. In this
chapter, we provide a theoretical model to show that the enhancement of agricul-
tural productivity induced by GM soybean cultivation can reduce land value and
then mitigate land conflicts. To assess the validity of this theoretical prediction, we
employ the Difference-in-Differences estimation and find that states that have more
land that is suitable for cultivating GM soybeans after the legalization in 2003 are
negatively associated with land conflicts. The empirical results on the mitigating
effect of GM soybean cultivation on land conflicts are reinforced by a series of ro-
bustness checks. The fifth chapter is the conclusion of this dissertation. Specifically,
we summarize the contents and achievement of this dissertation.
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In the last 50 years, armed conflicts have become increasingly prevalent. According
to the Armed Conflict Dataset version 2015 (ACD 2015) from the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (UCDP) and International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)
which covers 171 countries from 1946 to 2014, conflicts can be grouped into three
categories: 1) civil conflict incidence, 2) war incidence and 3) conflict onset.1 Ac-
cording to statistics from UCDP/PRIO and their conflict definitions, 102 out of 171
countries experienced at least one civil conflict incidence from 1946 to 2014. This
accounts for 60% of observational countries in the ACD 2015. UCDP/PRIO also
reveals that war incidence occurs most among these three conflict types. A summary
of frequencies of conflicts are provided in Table 1.1:
Table 1.1: Frequency of conflicts (1946-2014)
Conflict type Frequency
War incidence 1855
Civil conflict incidence 1408
Conflict onset 169
Total 3432
The frequencies of war incidence, civil conflict incidence and conflict onset from
1Civil conflict incidence is a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or ter-
ritory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government
of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. War incidence is the same as civil conflict
incidence except the battle-related deaths is at least 1000. Conflict onset is new outbreak of civil
conflict or war incidence.
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1946 to 2014 are 1855, 1408 and 169 respectively for 171 countries in the world.
According to statistics from the ACD 2015 provided by UCDP/PRIO, in terms of
the total number of conflicts (civil conflict and war incidence and onset) from 1946
to 2014, Burma (177), India (134), Israel(134), Philippines (132), Ethiopia (124),
Sudan (123), Iraq (114), Colombia (111), Afghanistan (109), and Angola (87) are
the top 10 countries with the most number of conflicts encountered.
Figure 1.1: Civil conflict incidence (1946-2014)
Figure 1.2: War incidence (1946-2014)
Figures 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 show the changes in civil conflict incidence, war incidence
and onset from 1946 to 2014. It shows that the number of conflicts begins to increase
in the 1950s and reaches its peak in the mid-1990s. Additionally, conflicts are highly
concentrated in some regions. From Table 1.2, we can see most of conflicts occurred
2
in Africa and Asia. For instance, there are 916 civil conflict incidences in Africa
and Asia. This accounts for about 65% of total civil conflicts. A similar pattern is
observed in war incidence and onset. There are 1255 war incidences and 113 onsets
in Africa and Asia. They account for more than 67% of total war incidences and
onsets.
Figure 1.3: Onset (1946-2014)
Table 1.2: Distribution of conflicts (1946-2014)
Region Civil conflict incidence War incidence Onset
Africa 473 636 60
Asia 443 619 53
Central America 72 91 9
Europe 78 100 19
Middle East 228 277 16
North America 16 17 2
Ocenia 6 6 1
South America 92 109 9
Total 1408 1855 169
A rise in the number of conflicts is followed by an increase in casualties. Accord-
ing to UCDP/PRIO, 992,219 people have been killed from conflicts between 1989
to 2016 (see Figure 1.4 for the battle-related deaths).
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Figure 1.4: Battle-related deaths (1989-2016)
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature
review on the relationship between agriculture, income and conflicts. In general,
developing countries tend to be dependent on the agricultural sector. Given that
income shocks can cause conflict, there is a large literature that looks at how conflicts
may arise due to negative rainfall shocks. In Chapter 3, I discuss issues concerning
the existing literature and provide a new study on estimating the impact of rainfall
shocks on conflicts in light of these concerns.
Because negative shocks to the agricultural sector could lead to conflicts, it
is plausible that productivity-enhancing technology in agriculture can help reduce
conflicts in agriculturally dependent regions. In Chapter 4, I investigate the effect of
an improvement in agricultural productivity induced by the adoption of Genetically-
modified (GM) soybeans on conflicts. Specifically, I exploit the policy experiment
about the commercial legalization of GM soybean cultivation in 2003 in Brazil and
examine its impact on land conflicts. In Chapter 5, I conclude this thesis with a






This chapter provides an overview of existing studies on the relationship between
agriculture, income and conflicts.1 We first discuss the implications of armed con-
flicts on economic development. We then review the development of conflict-related
studies in the literature and the econometric methods used to estimate the effect of
income variations on conflicts. Specifically, we provide thorough discussion about
the use of instrument variable estimation strategy to examine the effect of income
on conflicts. Next, we extend our investigation to the role of agriculture on conflicts
and more importantly, we argue that the enhancement of agricultural productivity
can mitigate conflicts.
1Conflicts are defined as any type of conflicts explained above in chapter 1.
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2.2 The Importance of Studying Conflicts from
an Economic Development Perspective
To understand the reasons for studying conflicts, we begin by comprehending how
conflicts can hinder economic development. In this section, we argue that armed
conflicts can precipitate sex ratio imbalance, child mortality and the spread of HIV
virus in victim countries. Moreover, people who are exposed to conflicts will undergo
disadvantages in the labour market in the future. Therefore, it is highly important to
study and understand the determinants of conflicts from an economic development
perspective.
Firstly, conflicts can distort the marriage market and precipitate sex ratio im-
balance and child mortality. Conflicts are usually accompanied by high casualty.
For instance, Brainerd (2017) shows that World War II caused about 13.5% of the
prewar population (or about 26 to 27 million) in Soviet Union to be killed. Beth-
mann and Kvasnicka (2013) also provides evidence that about half a million military
personnels were missing only in the state of Bavaria in Germany during World War
II. Men accounted for the majority of casualties. In return, the supply of men in
the marriage market was in shortage and the sex ratio between men and women
was imbalanced. This can lead to a marriage squeeze and an increase of out-of-
wedlock childbearing (Brainerd 2017). Additionally, an increase of out-of-wedlock
childbearing because of a man shortage induced by conflicts is positively associated
with infant mortality. To take the state of Bavaria in Germany as an example,
about one in six children was born by out-of wedlock mothers died after World War
II (Bethmann and Kvasnicka 2013). Therefore, conflicts can cause marriage market
distortion, sex ratio imbalance and high child mortality.
Secondly, HIV infection during and after conflicts can be escalated rapidly. Iqbal
and Zorn (2010) argue that the high prevalence of HIV in Africa attributes to armed
conflicts. There are two reasons to explain the link between conflict incidence and
HIV prevalence. The first reason is that conflicts can increase the chances of unin-
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fected people interacting with infected ones. Movement of people is particularly high
during and after armed conflicts as many refugees and migrants are displaced. This
can result in spreading of HIV (Decosas et al. 1995; Decosas and Adrien 1996). The
second reason is that conflicts can cause an increase in abnormality of sexual behav-
ior and then in the likelihood of contracting HIV. Elbe (2002) reveals that soldiers
during conflicts are of sexually active age and are prone to perform high-risk sexual
behavior. Consequently, armed conflicts would lead to higher HIV prevalence.
Thirdly, young victims in conflicts will experience adversity in the future labour
market. For example, Galdo (2013) argues that victims in conflicts have more
difficulty in obtaining jobs and earn less even if they are employed in the future.
The obvious reason is that many facilities that are used for education and training
are destroyed in conflicts. Therefore, young victims in conflicts cannot acquire the
skills and qualifications that they need for their future jobs. As a result, they will
earn less and some will be unemployed.
2.3 The Development of Conflict-related Studies
in the Literature
Initially, economic researchers disregard topics of conflicts in the international eco-
nomic development (Blattman and Miguel 2010). For instance, Blattman and
Miguel (2010) find that conflict-related topics are not covered in two highly used de-
velopment economics textbooks in undergraduate courses.2 Moreover, they surveyed
36 development economics syllabus in major U.S. universities and discovered that
only 13% of undergraduate and 24% of graduate courses discussed conflict-related
topics. Therefore, topics of conflicts are neglected in the early stages of economic
development studies.
The seminal studies in conflict literature may be Collier and Hoeffler (1998),
Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004). These studies system-
2These two development economics textbooks are Ray (1998) and Todaro (1999).
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atically provide cross-country evidence to understand the impact of economic and
ethnic factors on conflicts. Specifically, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Collier and
Hoeffler (2004) apply logit and probit models to examine the roles of initial income,
initial share of primary commodity exports to GDP, ethno-linguistic fractionalisa-
tion and population level on occurrence of armed conflicts. Their studies find that
income, rather than ethnic fractionalization and social grievance, can affect conflict
likelihood. However, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that conflicts are positively
influenced by ethnic and language fractionalization.
These three papers provide early discussion and understanding on the determi-
nants of conflicts. However, there are two major drawbacks in these three studies.
Firstly, their studies are cross-sectional studies on developing countries. Therefore,
it is impossible to control the country fixed effect in their estimation. This leads to
a problem of omitted variable bias in their estimation. Moreover, the problem of
omitted variable bias is further presented in their papers as factors that are corre-
lated with conflicts and income cannot be fully controlled in their empirical models.
For example, income levels are positively correlated with institutional qualities and
these institutional qualities are potential determinants of conflict incidence.3 Lastly,
identifying the true effect of income on conflicts is undermined by reverse causality
as occurrence of conflicts can affect income (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Therefore,
the effect of income on conflicts cannot identify correctly in light of reverse causality.
2.4 The Estimation of the Effect of Income Vari-
ations on Conflicts
Given the drawbacks that exist in Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Collier and Hoeffler
(2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), researchers seek better estimation strategies to
investigate the effect of income on conflicts properly. We will survey these estimation
strategies and summarize them in this section. In particular, we discuss the uses of
3Institutional qualities are democracy and corruption level.
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instrument variable estimation for identifying the impact of income on conflicts.
2.4.1 Instrument Variable Strategy: Weather Conditions
As the problems of omitted variable bias and reverse causality prevail, the literature
explores the panel data structure and seeks valid instruments to identify the effect of
income on conflicts. The pioneering study that applies instrument variable strategy
to estimate the effect of income on conflict is Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004).
Their study explores the variations of rainfall as a source of income shocks and
finds that a decrease in rainfall growth is associated with an economic contraction,
whilst an increase in rainfall growth is linked to economic expansion. Economic
contractions can decrease the opportunity cost of participating in conflicts, which
leads to a greater probability of conflict incidence. Conversely, economic expansions
increase the opportunity cost of participating in conflicts, leading to fewer conflict
incidences. Their paper is a seminal study on investigating the link between income
shocks arising from weather variations (or climate change) and conflicts in African
countries.
Mechanisms of Weather Conditions on Conflicts
In this section, we present the existing evidence on how weather variations (i.e.
volatility of rainfall and temperature level) affects conflicts from three channels.
The first channel is the income channel. Agricultural income plays a significant
role in African and other developing economies. For instance, the World Bank
data reveals that agricultural income accounts for more than 30% of GDP in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) from 1960 to 1997.4 A report from the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) shows that over 60% of the workforce
from developing countries is involved in the agricultural sector.5 Given that many
poor and rural people work in the agricultural sector, the growth of this sector can
effectively alleviate the problem of poverty in SSA. All in all, performance of the
4please refer to Table 1 in Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl (2010).
5please see http : //www.fao.org/docrep/015/i2490e/i2490e01b.pdf
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agricultural sector is crucial to income growth in developing countries.
Economic performance in the agricultural sector and aggregate income in de-
veloping countries are affected by weather conditions (i.e. variation of rainfall and
temperature level). For example, if the precipitation supply is stable and sufficient
(or the temperature is favorable for cultivating crops), crop yields are high. In
contrast, if the precipitation supply is insufficient (or the temperature is too high
or too low), arable land is destroyed and irrigation is negatively affected. In turn,
the degradation of environment inevitably leads to a reduction in crop yields and
then in household income. Dell, Jones and Olken (2012) demonstrate that a de-
crease in temperature can reduce agricultural output and economic growth in poor
countries. Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl (2010) also conclude that there is a posi-
tive relationship between favorable weather conditions and income in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Hsiang (2010) examines the destructive effect of abnormal temperatures and
cyclones on economic production in Central America and reinforces the relationship
between weather and income.
Therefore, variations of rainfall and temperature level can affect economies that
are highly dependent on agricultural income, which consequently affect the like-
lihood of conflict incidence. In the gun-or-butter model in Powell (1993) or the
appropriate-or-production model in Grossman (1994) assume that people can par-
ticipate in illegal activities like armed conflicts and that the likelihood of conflict
incidence is governed by the opportunity cost of participating in these conflicts. Col-
lier and Hoeffler (1998) argue that income variations can determine the opportunity
cost of participating in conflicts. In the context of weather conditions, when there
is favorable weather in terms of appropriate precipitation and temperature level,
agricultural incomes are enhanced. In return, people are less willing to participate
in conflicts as the opportunity cost of participating is increased. Therefore, there is
a negative association between favourable weather conditions and conflict incidence.
The second channel is the environmental insecurity (Benjaminsen 2008). This
literature argues that desertification and environmental degradation arising from
10
extreme weather conditions can cause food supply scarcity and intensify sentiments
of grievance toward a government. This results in social unrest and political insta-
bility. For example, Caruso, Petrarca and Ricciuti (2016) explain that rice crops are
a staple food for the majority of Indonesians and that the supply of this staple food
would be diminished if temperature rises or precipitation reduces. Consequently, the
price of rice soars. The rising prices arouse dissatisfaction toward the government
and then lead to social unrest. Hendrix and Haggard (2015) is another example
argued that extreme weather can destroy crop cultivation environment and drive up
the global food prices, which results in destabilizing political institutes in Africa.
The third channel is the impact of mass migration arising from abnormal weather
on conflicts. Extreme weather leads to internal and external migration.6 Marchiori,
Maystadt and Schumacher (2012) develop a theoretical model to demonstrate that
weather anomalies prompt mass migrations and conflicts. The key insight is that
extreme weather can reduce income for people living in rural areas. This leads to
urbanisation where rural families migrate to cities looking for employments. Subse-
quently, this generates a downward pressure on urban residents’ wage and intensifies
resource depletion and tension between different ethnic groups (Ghimire, Ferreira
and Dorfman 2015). Empirically, Marchiori, Maystadt and Schumacher (2012) show
that weather abnormality led to at least 128,000 people displaced in SSA between
1960 to 2000 and the displacements due to extreme weather resulted in an increasing
violence incidence in migrant recipient regions.
2.4.2 Instrument Variable Strategy: Commodity Price Volatil-
ity and Foreign Interest Rate Movements
The literature also explores other identification strategies to estimate the effect of
income on conflicts. For instance, Brückner and Ciccone (2010) and Bazzi and
Blattman (2014) use international commodity prices as instrument variables to cap-
6Internal migration refers to migrant movement within a country whereas external migration
means migrant movement between different countries.
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ture the impact of income variations on conflicts in Africa. Their identification
strategy is based on evidence showing income in these African countries is heavily
dependent on commodity-exporting revenue. Fluctuation of international commod-
ity prices can affect exporting revenue and then income in African countries. In
other words, there is a positive income shock when international commodity prices
increase. Hence, it is plausible to employ variation of international commodity prices
to be the instrument variable for identifying the effect of income on conflicts.7
Additionally, other studies follow the spirit of Brückner and Ciccone (2010) and
Bazzi and Blattman (2014) to use different types of price indexes for identifying
income variations. The related studies are Maystadt and Ecker (2014) using vari-
ations of livestock prices and Fjelde (2015) exploring the volatility of agricultural
price indexes. To summarize, many studies so far employ income variations from
some specific industries (i.e. agriculture and exporting sectors) to develop the iden-
tification strategy.
Lastly, the literature also uses foreign interest rate movements to identify the
effect of income shocks on conflicts. Hull and Imai (2013) argue that many develop-
ing countries commit to fixed exchange rate regimes and free capital mobility. This
means that interest rate setting in many developing economies are fully sensitive to
foreign interest rate fluctuations in developed countries like the U.S. and UK. This
is because many developing economies must abandon their monetary dependency
in order to implicitly or even explicitly peg their currencies against these developed
economies (Calvo and Reinhart 2002; Aizenman, Chinn and Ito 2008). Since interest
rate fluctuations can significantly influence short-run economic growth, developed
countries’ foreign interest rate movements are correlated with income variations in
developing economies.8 Therefore, interest rate movements in developed economies
can serve as a good instrument variable to identify the impact of income on conflict
incidence in developing countries.
7However, we must assume that African countries do not have market power to set international
commodity prices in this identification strategy.
8However, interest rate settings in developed economies cannot be reversely affected by varia-
tions of interest rate in any developing economy.
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2.4.3 The Effect of Income Shocks on Conflicts: Has a Con-
sensus Been Reached?
Even though many studies employ different identification strategies to estimate the
effect of income shocks on conflicts, a consensus about the relationship between in-
come variations and conflict incidence still cannot be reached. For example, there
are still many disputes among studies that examine the link between weather condi-
tions and conflicts (Salehyan 2008). On one hand, Burke et al. (2009), Hsiang, Meng
and Cane (2011), O’Loughlin et al. (2012) and Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014)
assert that temperature and precipitation levels are determinants of conflict inci-
dence. These papers focus on African countries with different time periods. Hodler
and Raschky (2014) use sub-national administrative regions in Africa and find a
negative relationship between rainfall and conflicts. Moreover, many other studies
expand their investigations to other countries (i.e. Brazil, China and Indonesia) and
draw the same conclusion about the association between weather abnormality and
conflicts (see Hidalgo et al. 2010; Bai and Kung 2011; Caruso, Petrarca and Ricciuti
2016).
On the other hand, some studies challenge the validity of the association between
weather conditions and conflicts. For instance, Ciccone (2011) finds that the result
about the negative relationship between rainfall growth and conflict incidence is not
robust after revising the conflict and rainfall datasets. Moreover, Buhaug (2010)
challenges the results in Burke et al. (2009) and argues that the results in Burke
et al. (2009) are sensitive to model specification and different measures of conflict
variables. Some studies even find a positive, instead of negative, relationship between
rainfall and conflicts as the literature suggests. For instance, Slettebak (2012) and
Gartzke (2012) provide estimation results and argue that the link between rainfall
and conflicts is positive.9 So far, results about the effect of weather conditions on
conflicts are mixed in the literature.
9Slettebak (2012) explains that people become more united and anti-social sentiment is less
intensified during extreme weather events.
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2.4.4 The Potential Issues in the Estimation of Income Vari-
ations on Conflicts
In this section, we discuss potential issues that could hinder the estimation of the
impact of income on conflicts. In particular, we consider how problems arising
from measurement errors in the conflict and rainfall datasets, the functional form of
weather variables and cross-sectional dependence affect the estimation, which could
lead to mixed results on the relationship between income variations and conflicts.
Firstly, data issues exist in the rainfall and conflict datasets. For instance, mea-
surement errors due to coding errors in the previous conflict datasets can hinder the
accuracy and inference of estimates in the estimation of the effect of weather con-
ditions on conflicts. The Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) for country-level studies
is widely used by many studies.10 The ACD is provided by UCDP/PRIO and is
revised periodically to eliminate measurement errors. Therefore, there are multiple
ACD versions available. The early versions of ACD contains specific coding errors
that are recorded by the data provider.11 These errors in the early ACD version can
result in overcount or undercount in conflict variables. If studies use early conflict
data versions to estimate the effect of rainfall on conflicts, estimates and their infer-
ence in the estimation are not robust. For example, Miguel and Satyanath (2010)
reveal that the results in Ciccone (2011) are not robust because Ciccone (2011) was
using the outdated conflict data. Additionally, the definition of conflict variables is
unclear. Consequently, the number of conflicts in the conflict dataset may be differ-
ent even if the observational time period and country are the same. For example,
Buhaug (2010) finds that the results regarding the effects of temperature and pre-
cipitation on conflicts in Burke et al. (2009) are not valid after different definitions of
conflicts are considered. Specifically, when Buhaug (2010) considers another conflict
definition–civil conflict incidence that captures conflicts leading to at least 25 battle
deaths, the results in Burke et al. (2009) are no longer robust.
10See Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004); Ciccone (2011) and Miguel and Satyanath (2011).
11To see the historical errata for each ACD version, please visit
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/ucdp-data/replication-datasets/
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Secondly, the functional form of weather variables can affect the estimation of
the impact of weather on conflicts. Some studies select rainfall shocks to capture the
effect of rainfall changes on conflicts in the estimation (see Miguel, Satyanath and
Sergenti 2004; Miguel and Satyanath 2011).12 However, Ciccone (2011) and Sarsons
(2015) argue that using the functional form of rainfall shocks is not appropriate
because of mean reversion in rainfall data. The property of mean reversion indicates
that there is a long-run equilibrium or trend in the rainfall data and that a deviation
from the long-run trend is temporary. In other words, mean reversion in the rainfall
data implies that the negative rainfall shock at period t is always followed by a
positive rainfall shock in the next period(s). Therefore, Ciccone (2011) argues that
the negative association between rainfall shocks and conflicts claimed by Miguel,
Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) is because of the existence of mean reversion and the
negative relationship is not valid when rainfall variable is in the log form.
Thirdly, the traditional two-way fixed effect estimator is highly used in the con-
flict literature. For example, Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) and Ciccone
(2011) employ this estimator to investigate the effect of rainfall on conflicts. Brück-
ner and Ciccone (2010) and Blattman and Miguel (2010) also use this traditional
estimator to examine the impact of commodity price on conflicts. This estimator as-
sume that the observational units (i.e. countries) are cross-sectionally independent
in the panel data structure. However, the assumption of cross-sectional indepen-
dence in these studies mentioned above is problematic due to two reasons. The first
reason is that weather patterns (i.e. rainfall and temperature levels) are spatially
correlated across observational units (Auffhammer et al. 2013; Dell, Jones and Olken
2014). The second reason is that conflicts in one country may spill over onto neigh-
boring countries (Aydin 2008). The conflict spillovers occur because of economic
integration and mass migration flow among different countries when conflicts break
out (see Murdoch and Sandler 2002; Murdoch and Sandler 2004). All in all, the
12Rainfall shocks are rainfall growth for country i and period t, which is computed as:
(Rainfallit−Rainfallit−1)/Rainfallit−1. Rainfallit and Rainfallit−1 are rainfall levels at period
t and t− 1 in country i.
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observational units in the panel data structure in these conflict-related studies may
be cross-sectionally dependent. If so, the traditional two-way fixed effect estimator
is not suitable for estimating the effect of income variations on conflicts. Pesaran
(2006) argue that estimates are not consistent and their statistical inferences are
no longer robust when the problem of cross-sectional dependence prevails in the
traditional two-way fixed effect model.
2.5 The Role of Agriculture in Economic Devel-
opment
In may developing countries, the agricultural sector contributes significantly to their
economies. According to Gollin (2010), 65% of the labor force in developing countries
is directly employed in the agricultural sector and the agricultural sector in these
countries accounts for 25-30% of its GDP.13 In this section, a summary is provided
to understand how agriculture can enhance economic development on the basis of
the discussion in Johnston and Mellor (1961), Johnston (1970) and Timmer (2002).
Firstly, agricultural development can contribute to stabilization of food supply
and prices (Johnson 1997). When the world population rises remarkably from the
last centenary, meeting food demand becomes more and more challenging. If food
demand cannot be met with a stable supply, food prices would soar. This would
adversely affect many households. However, better agricultural development can
expand food production to feed an increasing population and achieve the basic
needs of an economy. More importantly, steady food production in the agriculture
section can stabilize food prices, which will be beneficial to many households. Hence,
agriculture is essential for economic development.
Secondly, Johnston and Mellor (1961) argue that an expansion in agriculture
can increase national income by boosting agricultural exports. After agricultural
13Employment in the agricultural sector exceeds 70% of the working population in the East
African region and the agricultural sector in Africa and Southern Asia contributes to over 40% of
its GDP.
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production can satisfy food demand in the domestic market, the production surplus
can become cash crops and be exported to overseas markets. Dawson (2005) studies
the role of agricultural exports in 62 developing countries and find a positive asso-
ciation between agricultural exports and economic growth. Therefore, agricultural
development is an effective approach to accumulate foreign earning and improve
national income.
Thirdly, agricultural development is interrelated with other non-agriculture sec-
tors (i.e. service and manufacturing sectors) and the progress of agricultural de-
velopment can accelerate industrialization and sustain long-run economic growth.
Johnston (1970) argues that development in the agriculture sector can initiate a
structural transformation and provide two important inputs for industrialization.
The first input is labour. The agricultural development is accompanied by an in-
crease of labour productivity in the agricultural sector. This results in a labour
surplus in the agricultural sector and this surplus can be absorbed in the non-
agricultural sectors that are in need of labour force. The second input is capital.
Johnston and Mellor (1961) assert that agricultural development can contribute to
capital formation and allocate this capital to other sectors. With the supply of
labour and capital and their reallocation from the agricultural sector or low produc-
tivity sector to non-agricultural sectors or high productivity sectors, development in
the agricultural sector is a prerequisite for industrialization and long-run economic
growth in early stages of economic development in some industrialized countries. For
example, Johnston (1951) analyzes the economic development in the early stages of
Japan and UK and find that industrialization in these countries started with better
development in the agricultural sector.
2.5.1 The Relationship Between Agricultural Income, GDP
Per Capita and Civil Conflict Incidence
The discussion above argues that the role of agriculture is essential to economic
development. However, this does not mean that developing agriculture sector abso-
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lutely leads to a high income level. As early as Fisher (1939), many studies assert
that there is a negative association between the share of agriculture value and income
level.14 In other words, countries that are heavily dependent on their agriculture
sector to generate income are low-income countries. To further justify this negative
relationship, we extract data of GDP per capita and share of agriculture added value
in GDP (unit being percentage) from 1960 to 2014 for 150 countries from the World
Development Indicators.
Figure 2.1: Income and agriculture
Note: Data is extracted from World Development Indicators
As we can see in Figure 2.1, the dots represent the log GDP per capita and the
vertical axis is the percentage of agriculture added value in GDP. The claim about
the negative relationship between income level and relative value of the agriculture
sector in GDP is reinforced in Figure 2.1.
Given low income engenders more conflicts, the negative association between
income and relative value of the agriculture sector in GDP implies that the relation-
ship between relative value of the agriculture sector in GDP and conflicts is positive.
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that an expansion
of income can result in reduction of conflicts. Additionally, Miguel, Satyanath and
14Share of agriculture value can be measured as the size of employment and output in the
agriculture sector. Please also see Kuznets (1963).
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Sergenti (2004) reveal that a decrease in agricultural income arising from negative
rainfall shocks leads to an increase in conflict incidence in the agriculture-led coun-
tries. This may suggest that the association between agriculture (especially its share
in GDP) and conflicts is nontrivial.
Figure 2.2: Agriculture and conflicts
Note: Data is from World Development Indicators and UCDP/PRIO
We obtain the total number of civil conflict incidences for 150 countries between
1946 and 2014 from UCDP/PRIO.15 In Figure 2.2, we plot the relationship between
the value of the agricultural sector in GDP and a summation of civil conflict inci-
dence for each country and find that their correlation is positive. This may suggest
that countries that rely more on agricultural income are more prone to experience
civil conflicts.
2.5.2 Can Agricultural Productivity Improvement Reduce
Conflicts?
When income in a country relies more on the agricultural sector or the share of the
agricultural sector in GDP is large, agricultural productivity level is particularly
low (Johnston and Mellor 1961). Given the relationship between the value of the
15The definition of civil conflict incidence remains the same as the introduction chapter above.
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agricultural sector in GDP and conflicts is positive, and the association between the
value of agricultural sector in GDP and agricultural productivity is negative, we may
argue that countries with low agricultural productivity are more likely to experience
conflicts. To examine this claim, we plot labour productivity in the agricultural
sector against the total number of civil conflicts for the same 150 countries from 1946
to 2014 in Figure 2.3. A negative relationship between agricultural productivity and
conflicts is presented in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Agriculture productivity and conflicts
Note: Data is from World Development Indicators and UCDP/PRIO
The improvement of agricultural productivity can increase income level and sub-
sequently reduce conflicts. The key mechanism is that improving agricultural pro-
ductivity results in structural transformation and industrialization (Johnston 1951;
Johnston 1970). This is because agricultural productivity enhancement can release
manpower to non-agricultural sectors and accumulate capital (Johnston and Mellor
1961). Labour resource reallocation and capital accumulation are essential paths to
industrialization. Therefore, an increase in agricultural productivity can results in
an expansion of income and long-run economic growth (Gollin, Parente and Roger-
son 2002; Self and Grabowski 2007). Thereby, conflicts are reduced because of an
income increase induced by improvement of agricultural productivity.
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Chapter 3
Economic Shocks, Rainfall and
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Abstract: It is well-documented that rainfall shocks have an opposite effect on
conflicts. However, much of this literature uses past versions of the rainfall and con-
flict datasets and does not account for cross-sectional dependence between countries
that may arise from spatially dependent weather patterns and cross-border conflict
spillovers. We find that estimates in the conflict and rainfall data are substantially
varied across different versions and the statistical significance of the effect of rainfall
shocks on conflicts disappears when the estimation is carried out with the most re-
cently revised rainfall and conflict datasets. However, with the most recent rainfall
and conflict data and taking cross-sectional dependence into account by using inter-





Over the last 50 years, civil conflict has occurred in nearly half of the countries in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSAs in short). Because it severely impairs economic development,
there has been great interest in understanding why it is so frequent in the SSAs. In
an influential paper, Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004), henceforth MMS, show
that civil conflict in the SSAs is strongly associated with the occurrence of negative
rainfall shocks.1 This conforms to the idea that since the SSAs are economically
dependent on the agricultural sector, negative rainfall shocks are income reducing as
they reduce agricultural output (Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl 2010). Consequently,
individuals would be more willing to participate in conflict as their income, and thus
their opportunity cost of fighting, is reduced (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Grossman
1991)
In this study, we investigate if the statistical significance of the negative associ-
ation between rainfall and civil conflicts in the SSAs reported by MMS is robust to
two departures from the way they estimated this effect, namely 1) the use of newer
versions of rainfall and conflict datasets (from the ones used by MMS), and 2) the
use of interactive fixed effects in panel regressions. The rainfall and conflict datasets
employed by MMS are GPCP 2.0 (Global Precipitation Climatology Project, ver-
sion 2.0) and ACD 2004 (Armed Conflict Database, version 2004) respectively. Since
then, two revised rainfall (GPCP 2.1 and 2.2) and conflict (ACD 2010 and 2015)
datasets have become available. The updates in these revised datasets are made pri-
marily to eliminate measurement errors.2 However, as it turns out, the measurement
of rainfall and conflict contained in the later datasets vary substantively from what
was reported by the earlier rainfall (GPCP 2.0) and conflict (ACD 2004) datasets
used by MMS. At this point, it is not known how these revisions might affect the
impact of rainfall on conflicts.
Besides the concern about data revisions, we also consider if the negative asso-
1The definition of rainfall shocks is provided in the data section below.
2See the data section for more discussion.
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ciation between rainfall and conflict is robust to accounting for spatial dependence
in weather patterns (Auffhammer et al. 2013) and the fact that conflicts may spill
across borders (Aydin 2008). These contribute towards the cross-sectional depen-
dence of countries. From an econometric perspective, cross-sectional dependence
may confound regression’s estimates. If one uses a panel estimator that is not robust
to cross-sectional dependence, as is the two-way fixed effects estimator employed by
MMS, the estimated effect of rainfall shocks on conflicts could be inconsistent. In
this case, a more robust approach would be to use panel regression techniques that
incorporate interactive fixed effects, such as the common correlated effects (CCE)
estimator proposed by (Pesaran 2006), given that interactive fixed effects can cap-
ture cross-sectional dependence and take into account of its potentially confounding
effects.
Finally, we revisit the effect of rainfall on conflicts when rainfall is modeled with
various functional forms. In the literature, the question of how rainfall should be
modeled has important implications and is subject to much debate (Miguel and
Satyanath 2011). On one hand, Ciccone (2011) and Sarsons (2015) argue that the
model to estimate the effect of rainfall shocks on conflicts could be misspecified if
rainfall is mean reverting, in which case, they suggest that rainfall should be modeled
in log levels instead.3 On the other hand, Dell, Jones and Olken (2014) suggest that
rainfall should be modeled in its mean deviation form instead as rainfall data does
not follow a normal distribution.4
Generally, we find that the statistical significance of the effect of rainfall shocks
on conflicts is not robust when revised rainfall and/or conflict datasets are used.
For example, based on the same 41 countries and the period from 1980 to 1999 as
considered by MMS, we find that the effect of rainfall shocks on conflicts is statis-
tically significant when the GPCP 2.0 rainfall dataset and the ACD 2004 conflict
3Mean reversion indicate that there is a long-run equilibrium or trend in the rainfall data and
that negative rainfall shocks in time t-1 are followed by positive rainfall shocks or vice versa in
time t or t+1.
4The definition of mean deviation rainfall variable is properly discussed in the variable section
below. Hidalgo et al. (2010) also implement mean deviation form in the rainfall variable.
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dataset are used. However, with the same countries and time period, the statistical
significance mostly disappears when we employ the GPCP 2.1 or GPCP 2.2 rainfall
datasets, or the ACD 2010 and ACD 2015 conflict datasets. Therefore, we cannot
rule out the possibility that the statistical significance of the effect of rainfall shocks
on conflicts is an artifact of measurement errors.
Secondly, we have evidence that rainfall shocks are cross-sectionally dependent
and the cross-border spillover of civil conflict is prevalent. This suggests that panel
regressions that take care of cross-sectional dependence should be employed when
modeling the effects of rainfall on conflicts. By using Pesaran (2006)’s CCE esti-
mator to deal with cross-sectional dependence, we find that the effect of rainfall is
indeed statistically significant on reducing conflicts. Finally, we extend our CCE
estimation to different rainfall functional forms such as logarithm and mean devia-
tion. As rainfall are by these two functional forms, the effect of rainfall on conflicts
still remain statistically significant in the CCE estimation.
Although the literature on civil conflict is rapidly expanding, whether weather
conditions affect conflict incidence is still under much debate. For example, there is
a major group of studies (e.g.Burke et al. (2009); Hsiang, Meng and Cane (2011);
O’Loughlin, Linke and Witmer (2014); Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014)) showing
that weather conditions, such as precipitation or temperature levels have statisti-
cally significant effects on conflict outbreaks in African countries. However, this is
contested by another group of studies (e.g. Buhaug (2010); Ciccone (2011); Slette-
bak (2012)) arguing that the link between weather conditions and conflicts is weak
or may not even be present. This paper shows that more work on estimating the
effect of rainfall on conflicts would be useful.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data sources
and shows that measurements among different rainfall and conflict data versions are
substantially different. Section 3 outlines the empirical model with emphasis on
the problems of conventional two-way fixed effect model and improvements of CCE
estimator in the estimation. Section 4 presents the results followed by conclusion in
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Section 5.
3.2 Data and Variables
3.2.1 Data
Since MMS, the rainfall data provider Global Precipitation Climatology Project
(GPCP),5 and the conflict data provider Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) of Uppsala
Conflict Data Program have updated their datasets.6 The purpose of updates is not
only to extend the data to the later years but also correct erratas.7 In this study,
we explore the implications of using three different versions of rainfall and conflict
data, namely the GPCP 2.0, 2.1 and 2.2 datasets for the rainfall variable, and the
ACD 2004, 2010 and 2015 datasets for the conflict variable. GPCP 2.0 and 2.1 are
past rainfall datasets and ACD 2004 and 2010 are past conflict datasets. These past
datasets are obtained in the published studies. For instance, we obtain GPCP 2.0
and ACD 2004 from the study of MMS.8 Additionally, GPCP 2.1 and ACD 2010 are
obtained from Ciccone (2011). GPCP 2.2 and ACD 2015 are the most recent rainfall
and conflict datasets. These most recent datasets are sourced from the GPCP and
ACD websites.
For our results to be comparable to MMS, we use the same 41 African countries
and the same period from 1981 to 1999 as used by MMS. From there, we explore the
sensitivity of the estimates if the sample period is extended to 2009, as considered
by Ciccone (2011).
5Please see Adler et al. (2003) or GPCP (2018) for more details about this dataset.
6Please refer to Gleditsch et al. (2002) or ACD (2018) for more discussion about this dataset.
7The conflict and rainfall data providers have listed out all erratas in the previous data version
as the revised version is available.









where Rit is the rainfall level at year t and Rit−1 is the rainfall level at t−1. We also
follow MMS to construct three related dummy variables to indicate three different
aspects of conflict. The first dummy variable indicates the incidence of civil conflict.
For each country, it is coded as 1 for the year (or years) when an episode of armed
conflict that has resulted in at least 25 battle related deaths has taken placed. The
second dummy variable indicates the incidence of war. For each country, it is coded
as 1 for the year (or years) when an episode of armed conflict that has resulted in
at least 1000 battle related deaths has taken placed. The third dummy variable
indicates civil conflict onset. For each country, it is coded as 1 for the year during
which there is an outbreak of a new civil conflict or war incidence (for the second
and the subsequent years of same conflict or war, the onset dummy is coded as zero).
For the same country and year, rainfall could be recorded differently in different
versions of the rainfall datasets. As Table 3.1 shows, the mean and standard de-
viation of rainfall shocks based on the GPCP 2.0, 2.1 and 2.2 datasets differ even
if we focus on the same set of countries and years. For specific countries, what is
recorded by GPCP may vary significantly across the different versions. For instance,
for Cameroon between 1981 to 2009, the mean of its rainfall growth is reported as
0.0061 in GPCP 2.0, -0.0076 in GPCP 2.1 and -0.0016 in GPCP 2.2. For Uganda
between 1981 and 2009, the mean of its rainfall growth is reported as -0.0089 in
GPCP 2.0, 0.0222 in GPCP 2.1 and 0.0025 in GPCP 2.2.
The same consequences can be seen in the revisions of conflict datasets. Table
3.2 provides summary about the disparity from different conflict data versions in
1981-1999. We can take some specific countries out Table 3.2. Take Zaire as an
example. In Table 3.2, Zaire’s civil incidence is reported by ACD 2004 as 12 times.
Subsequently, this is revised to 6 times in ACD 2010, then 4 times in ACD 2015.
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Another example is Senegal. In Table 3.2, Senegal’s civil onset is reported as 4 times
by ACD 2004. Subsequently, this is revised to 5 times in ACD 2010 and 1 time in
ACD2015.
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Table 3.1: Variation of mean and standard deviation in rainfall growth
Country GPCP 2.0 (1981-1999) GPCP 2.1 (1981-1999) GPCP 2.2 (1981-1999)
Angola 0.0137 (0.1766) -0.0061 (0.1104) 0.0090 (0.0905)
Benin 0.0173 (0.1512) 0.0174 (0.1716) 0.0084 (0.1191)
Botswana 0.0462 (0.3742) 0.0622 (0.3783) 0.0752 (0.3891)
Burkina Faso 0.0144 (0.157) 0.0111 (0.1551) 0.0157 (0.1441)
Burundi 0.0157 (0.1604) 0.0008 (0.1591) 0.0106 (0.1432)
Cameroon 0.0061 (0.0957) -0.0076 (0.1075) -0.0016 (0.0950)
Central African 0.0041 (0.0816) -0.0078 (0.0786) -0.0023 (0.0687)
Chad 0.0134 (0.2400) 0.0109 (0.2250) 0.0064 (0.1506)
Congo 0.0040 (0.1150) -0.0067 (0.1144) 0.0040 (0.0874)
Djibouti 0.0234 (0.2434) 0.0129 (0.2598) 0.0193 (0.2353)
Ethiopia 0.0177 (0.1641) -0.0147 (0.1317) -0.0079 (0.1127)
Gabon 0.0104 (0.1204) -0.0093 (0.1356) 0.0082 (0.1363)
Gambia 0.0171 (0.1765) 0.0268 (0.2192) 0.0264 (0.2006)
Ghana 0.0135 (0.1782) 0.0026 (0.1779) 0.0064 (0.1506)
Guinea -0.0078 (0.1159) 0.0038 (0.1530) 0.0015 (0.1177)
Guinea-Bissau 0.0106 (0.1481) 0.0134 (0.1586) 0.0067 (0.1379)
Ivory Coast -0.0003 (0.1189) -0.0017 (0.1480) 0.0008 (0.1335)
Kenya 0.0430 (0.3388) 0.0322 (0.3945) 0.0426 (0.3496)
Lesotho 0.0268 (0.2262) 0.0183 (0.2448) 0.0402 (0.2526)
Liberia -0.0084 (0.1365) -0.0140 (0.1630) -0.0115 (0.1310)
Madagascar 0.0090 (0.1290) -0.0028 (0.1575) 0.0081 (0.1579)
Malawi 0.0242 (0.2616) 0.0105 (0.2210) 0.0213 (0.2122)
Mali 0.0137 (0.2005) 0.0172 (0.2099) 0.0151 (0.1837)
Mauritania 0.0256 (0.2838) 0.0522 (0.2991) 0.0466 (0.2806)
Mozambique 0.0254 (0.2138) 0.0092 (0.2183) 0.0150 (0.1951)
Namibia 0.1114 (0.5845) 0.1081 (0.4890) 0.1445 (0.5489)
Niger 0.0319 (0.3173) 0.0323 (0.2951) 0.0290 (0.2883)
Nigeria 0.0084 (0.0831) -0.0025 (0.0909) 0.0016 (0.0880)
Rwanda 0.0182 (0.1466) -0.0052 (0.1113) 0.0037 (0.0904)
Senegal 0.0155 (0.1791) 0.0271 (0.2142) 0.0244 (0.1901)
Sierra Leone -0.0128 (0.1265) -0.0089 (0.1624) -0.0107 (0.1164)
Somalia 0.0872 (0.4106) 0.0676 (0.4534) 0.0682 (0.4049)
South Africa 0.0237 (0.2412) 0.0208 (0.2721) 0.0395 (0.2722)
Sudan 0.0202 (0.1774) -0.0038 (0.1404) -0.0010 (0.1366)
Swaziland 0.0318 (0.3119) 0.0262 (0.3134) 0.0497 (0.3161)
Tanzania 0.0143 (0.2288) 0.0048 (0.2210) 0.0154 (0.2162)
Togo 0.0161 (0.1673) 0.0071 (0.1573) 0.0107 (0.1397)
Uganda -0.0089 (0.1249) 0.0222 (0.1918) 0.0025 (0.1123)
Zaire 0.0132 (0.1153) -0.0095 (0.0801) 0.0005 (0.0576)
Zambia 0.0110 (0.1836) 0.0031 (0.1781) 0.0147 (0.1639)
Zimbabwe 0.0416 (0.2907) 0.0271 (0.2972) 0.0363 (0.2806)
The value without parentheses is mean and standard deviation is in parentheses. The observational year is 1981-2009 and
observational country is 41 African countries.
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Table 3.2: Sum of conflicts (1981-1999)
Civil Incident Onset War Incident
Country ACD 2004 ACD 2010 ACD 2015 ACD 2004 ACD 2010 ACD 2015 ACD 2004 ACD 2010 ACD 2015
Angola 19 19 19 0 0 1 17 16 15
Bennin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Botswana 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Burkina Faso 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0
Burundi 8 8 8 2 2 0 1 1 0
Cameroon 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Central Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chad 17 15 15 1 3 0 11 5 2
Congo 3 5 4 1 2 1 3 2 2
Djibouti 1 5 5 1 2 1 0 0 0
Ethiopia 15 17 18 1 2 2 11 10 10
Gabon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gambia 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Ghana 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
Guinea 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Guinea-Bissau 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0
Ivory Coast 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kenya 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Lesotho 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Liberia 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 0
Madagascar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mali 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0
Mauritania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mozambique 12 12 12 0 0 0 12 11 11
Namibia 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 2 0
Niger 6 5 5 3 3 3 0 0 0
Nigeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rwanda 9 9 9 2 2 1 5 6 3
Senegal 7 8 6 4 5 1 1 0 0
Sierra Leone 9 9 9 1 1 1 2 2 3
Somalia 11 14 14 1 2 1 3 4 4
South Africa 13 9 8 0 1 1 13 6 6
Sudan 16 17 17 1 1 0 14 15 15
Swaziland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tanzania 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 4 0
Togo 2 4 1 2 4 1 0 0 0
Uganda 17 18 18 2 1 0 12 13 10
Zaire 12 6 4 1 3 0 11 6 4
Zambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zimbabwe 2 8 0 1 2 0 2 8 0
Total 199 207 185 38 48 20 124 112 85
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Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
To further investigate the extent to which the data revisions affect the data itself,
we conduct a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test to compare the shape
of empirical distribution in the rainfall variable across three data versions. To do
so, we first construct the empirical cumulative distribution of rainfall from each
version of the rainfall dataset (GPCP 2.0, 2.1 and 2.2) between 1981 and 1999.
Then, we perform a pairwise comparison of the empirical distribution and test the
null hypothesis that the empirical distributions are identical in this time period.
A rejection of the K-S under conventional significance levels will indicate that the
revisions made to the rainfall dataset have changed the distribution of rainfall in a
statistically significant way.
The variable in the K-S test is rainfall shocks from 1981 to 1999. We obtain the
data of rainfall shocks from three different data versions (GPCP 2.0, 2.1 and 2.2)
and then compare the shape of empirical distribution in pairwise among these three
versions. We start with GPCP 2.0 versus GPCP 2.1 and then move to GPCP 2.0
versus GPCP 2.2 and GPCP 2.1 versus 2.2.




(3) K-S test 0.16
(1): test the null hypothesis that GPCP 2.0 contains smaller values than for GPCP 2.1. The largest difference
between the distribution functions is 0.0572. The p-value is 0.081, which is significant at 5%. (2): test the null
hypothesis that GPCP 2.0 contains larger values than for GPCP 2.1. The largest difference between the distribution
function is -0.0374. The p-value for this is 0.341 and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. (3): test the null
hypothesis is the empirical cumulative distributions of GPCP 2.0 and GPCP 2.1 is identical (K-S test). The p-value
is 0.162 and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
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(3) K-S test 0.05
] (1): test the null hypothesis that GPCP 2.0 contains smaller values than for GPCP 2.2. The largest difference
between the distribution functions is 0.0589. The p-value for this is 0.027, which is significant at 5%. (2): test
the null hypothesis that GPCP 2.0 contains larger values than for GPCP 2.2. The largest difference between the
distribution function is -0.055. The p-value for this is 0.043, which is significant at 5%. (3): test the null hypothesis
is the empirical cumulative distributions of GPCP 2.0 and GPCP 2.2 is identical (K-S test). The p-value is 0.054
and the null hypothesis is rejected at 5%.




(3) K-S test 0.05
(1): test the null hypothesis that GPCP 2.1 contains smaller values than for GPCP 2.2. The largest difference
between the distribution functions is 0.0587. The p-value is 0.023, which is significant at 5%. (2): tests the hy-
pothesis that GPCP 2.1 contains larger values than for GPCP 2.2. The largest difference between the distribution
function is -0.0351.The p-value is 0.259 and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. (3): test the null hypothesis
that the empirical cumulative distributions of GPCP2.1 and GPCP2.2 are identical. The p-value is 0.046 and the
null hypothesis is rejected at 5%.
The results of K-S test for each pair (GPCP 2.0 vs GPCP 2.1, GPCP 2.0 vs
GPCP 2.2, GPCP 2.1 vs GPCP 2.2) are presented in the row (3) of Table 3.3, 3.4
and 3.5 above. The null hypothesis of K-S test is that the empirical cumulative
distributions of each pair are identical.
For example, the p-value of K-S test that compares GPCP 2.0 and GPCP 2.1 is
0.162. Thus, the null cannot be rejected at the 10% level of significance (see Row
(3) Table 3.3) . However, the p-value of K-S test that compares GPCP 2.0 and 2.2
37
is 0.05 (see Row (3) Table 3.4). This indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected
at the 5% level and there is evidence that the empirical cumulative distributions of
the rainfall shocks from the GPCP 2.0 and 2.2 datasets are not identical.
The final pair to be considered are GPCP 2.1 and 2.2. The p-value of the K-S
test for this pair is 0.05 ((see Row (3) Table 3.5)). This indicates that null hypothesis
is rejected at 5% and the empirical cumulative distributions between GPCP 2.1 and
2.2 are not identical.
Overall, the difference between GPCP 2.0 and 2.1 is not large enough for the
K-S test to be rejected at standard significance level. However, the revision from
GPCP 2.1 to 2.2 is significant enough for the K-S test to be rejected. Thus, it will be
interesting to see if the statistically significant effect of rainfall on conflict in MMS
still holds up with the revision.
3.3 Implication of Data Revisions
We first investigate how using the revised rainfall and conflict datasets may affect





βk∆Rit−k + ci + µt + εit, i = 1...N, t = 1...T (3.1)
where yit represents one of the three indicators of conflict, i.e. conflict incidence, war
incidence, or conflict onset, for country i at year t, and ∆Rit−k represents rainfall
shocks in country i and year t− k and is defined as the growth in rainfall levels (i.e.
∆Rit−k = (Rit−k − Rit−k−1)/Rit−k). In Eq. (3.1), we include rainfall shocks up to
the second lag following MMS (i.e. k = 0, 1, 2) so as to capture the potential lagged
effects of rainfall shocks on conflict. For the unobserved components in Eq. (3.1),
ci represents the set of the country fixed effects that capture all the unobserved
permanent differences across countries,9 µt represents the set of year fixed effects
9Quality of governmental institute can be a time invariant factor.
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that capture all macroeconomic shocks that have identical effects on countries,10 and
εit is the idiosyncratic error term. Our interest lies in estimating βk. It reflects the
change in the likelihood of civil conflict, war, or conflict onset when rainfall growth
increases by one percentage point.
As a benchmark, we first estimate the effect that rainfall shocks have on conflicts
using the datasets used originally by MMS. Then, we re-estimate this effect using
a newer version of the rainfall dataset, conflict dataset, or both, for the same set of
41 countries and years from 1981 to 1999 as considered by MMS.
For the sake of presentation, the actual two-way fixed effects estimates of effect
of rainfall shocks on conflicts, corresponding to each version of the GPCP rainfall
and ACD conflict datasets, are relegated to Table 20 in the appendix. Instead,
we summarize the statistical significance of the contemporaneous effects of rainfall
shocks on conflict incidence (as the dependent variable in Eq. (3.1)), war incidence,
and conflict onset in Table 3.6. The statistical significance of the lagged effect of
rainfall shocks on conflict is summarized in Table 3.7.
10These macroeconomic shocks could be commodity price shocks.
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Table 3.6: Significant level of ∆Rit on conflicts (1981-1999)
Panel A: Civil Conflict Incident
GPCP 2.0 GPCP 2.1 GPCP 2.2
ACD 2004 No No No
ACD 2010 No No No
ACD 2015 No No No
Panel B: Conflict Onset
ACD 2004 No No No
ACD 2010 No No No
ACD 2015 No No No
Panel C: War Incident
ACD 2004 Yes(5%) No No
ACD 2010 Yes(10%) Yes(5%) Yes(10%)
ACD 2015 No No No
Using the GPCP 2.0 rainfall and ACD 2004 conflict datasets, we have success-
fully replicated MMS’ estimate of the impact of contemporary and lagged (first lag)
rainfall shocks on conflict incidence, war incidence, and conflict onset (see panel A
of Table 20 in the appendix). As Table 3.6 shows, the effect of contemporary rain-
fall shocks (∆Rit) on war incidence is statistically significant at 5%. Additionally,
the estimated effect of lagged rainfall shocks (∆Rit−1) on conflict incidence, war
incidence, and conflict onset are all statistically significant at least at the 5% level.
Thus, if we estimate the effect of rainfall shocks on conflicts using the GPCP 2.0
and ACD2004 datasets, we would conclude that rainfall shocks, especially their first
lag, can explain conflict in the SSAs.
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Table 3.7: Significant level of ∆Rit−1 on conflicts (1981-1999)
Panel A: Civil Conflict Incident
GPCP 2.0 GPCP 2.1 GPCP 2.2
ACD 2004 Yes(5%) Yes(10%) Yes(10%)
ACD 2010 No Yes(10%) Yes(10%)
ACD 2015 No No No
Panel B: Conflict Onset
ACD 2004 Yes(10%) No No
ACD 2010 No No No
ACD 2015 No No No
Panel C: War Incident
ACD 2004 Yes(5%) No No
ACD 2010 No Yes(5%) Yes(10%)
ACD 2015 No Yes(5%) No
However, when the updated rainfall and/or conflict datasets are used to estimate
the impact of rainfall shocks in the contemporary and lagged one level on conflict,
the impact estimates may become statistically insignificant. For example in Panel
C Table 3.6, when we maintain the GPCP 2.0 rainfall dataset as MMS did, but
use the revised conflict dataset ACD 2015, the estimated effect of rainfall shocks in
contemporary level (∆Rit) on war incidence now become statistically insignificant.
The second example is in Panel B and C Table 3.7. When we maintain the ACD
2004 conflict dataset as MMS did, but use the revised rainfall dataset (i.e. GPCP
2.1 or GPCP 2.2), the estimated effect of rainfall shocks in lagged one (∆Rit−1) on
conflict onset and war incidence now become statistically insignificant (the effect
on conflict incidence is still statistically significant). Likewise, when we maintain
the use of the GPCP 2.0 rainfall dataset as MMS did, but use the revised conflict
datasets (i.e. ACD 2010 and 2015), all the rainfall shock estimates in lagged one
(∆Rit−1) that were once statistically significant, as reported in MMS, now become
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statistically insignificant on incidence, war, and onset (see Panel A, B and C Table
3.7).
Finally, when the latest conflict (ACD2015) and rainfall (GPCP2.2) datasets are
employed jointly, the effect of rainfall shocks in contemporary and lagged one level
(∆Rit and ∆Rit−1) on conflict incidence and onset and on war incidence are all
statistically insignificant in Table 3.6 and 3.7. Therefore, the statistically significant
effect of rainfall shocks on conflict, as found by MMS, is not robust to the revision of
the rainfall and conflict datasets. Furthermore, compared to conflict data revision,
rainfall data revision changes the estimated coefficients more in the estimation.
This is because when the rainfall data version is revised to GPCP 2.1 and 2.2, more
estimated coefficients turn to be statistically insignificant.11
3.3.1 Extending the Sample Period
We conduct a series of robustness checks toward previous results about how estimates
of statistical significance in MMS disappears after conflict and rainfall data are
revised. Firstly, we extend the observational year. Secondly, we add one more
time-lagged rainfall variable in the estimation.
In the previous exercise, the sample period is restricted to 1981 to 1999 and
is consistent with what MMS have considered. Here, we repeat the exercise with
the same 41 countries but with data stretching from 1981 to 2009 in the two-way
fixed effect model. For the sake of presentation, the estimates of the effect of rain-
fall shocks on conflicts corresponding to the most recent conflict data (ACD 2015)
and each version of rainfall data (GPCP 2.0, 2.1 and 2.2) are documented in the
appendix (see Table 21). We then summarize the statistical significance of the con-
temporaneous and lagged one effects of rainfall shocks (∆Rit and ∆Rit−1) on conflict
incidence, conflict onset and war incidence in Table 3.8 and 3.9.
As Table 3.8 shows, the contemporary rainfall shocks (∆Rit) on all conflict vari-
ables (incident, onset and war) are not statistically significant when conflict data
11Please refer to Table 3.6 and 3.7 above.
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is ACD 2015 and rainfall data is varied from GPCP 2.0 to GPCP 2.1 and GPCP
2.2. For the estimates of lagged one rainfall shocks (∆Rit−1) on all conflict variables
(incident, onset and war), Table 3.9 shows that they are statistically insignificant as
conflict data is ACD 2015 and rainfall data is GPCP 2.0, 2.1 and 2.2.
Table 3.8: Significance level of ∆Rit on conflicts (1981-2009)
Panel A: Civil Conflict Incident
GPCP 2.0 GPCP 2.1 GPCP 2.2
ACD 2015 No No No
Panel B: Conflict Onset
ACD 2015 No No No
Panel C: War Incident
ACD 2015 No No No
Table 3.9: Significance level of ∆Rit−1 on conflicts (1981-2009)
Panel A: Civil Conflict Incident
GPCP 2.0 GPCP 2.1 GPCP 2.2
ACD 2015 No No No
Panel B: Conflict Onset
ACD 2015 No No No
Panel C: War Incident
ACD 2015 No No No
3.3.2 Including the Second Lag of Rainfall Shocks
In this subsection, we follow Ciccone (2011) and Miguel and Satyanath (2011) to
add the second lag of rainfall shocks ∆Rit−2 and estimate the effect of rainfall shocks
on conflicts (conflict incident, onset and war incident) with the same 41 countries
and time span (1981-2009) in the two-way fixed effect model. The detail about
the estimates of the effect of rainfall shocks on conflicts are recorded in Panel B
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Table 21 in appendix. We then summarize the significance level of these estimates
in Table 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 and find that the significance level of these estimates
disappears when rainfall data is revised from GPCP 2.0 to GPCP 2.1 and 2.2 and
conflict data is ACD 2015. Take conflict incident as an example, the impacts of
rainfall shocks in time lagged one and two (∆Rit−1 and ∆Rit−2) on conflict incident
becomes statistically insignificant when rainfall data is revised from GPCP 2.0 to
GPCP 2.1 or 2.2 and conflict data is ACD 2015 (see Table 3.11 and 3.12). When the
newest rainfall and conflict datasets are jointly used (GPCP 2.2 and ACD 2015), the
contemporary, time lag one and two of rainfall shocks (∆Rit, ∆Rit−1 and ∆Rit−2) on
three conflict variables (conflict incident, onset and war incident) remain statistically
insignificant.
Table 3.10: Significance level of ∆Rit on conflicts (1981-2009)
Panel A: Civil Conflict Incident
GPCP 2.0 GPCP 2.1 GPCP 2.2
ACD 2015 No No No
Panel B: Conflict Onset
ACD 2015 No No No
Panel C: War Incident
ACD 2015 No No No
Table 3.11: Significance level of ∆Rit−1 on conflicts (1981-2009)
Panel A: Civil Conflict Incident
GPCP 2.0 GPCP 2.1 GPCP 2.2
ACD 2015 Yes(5%) Yes(10%) No
Panel B: Conflict Onset
ACD 2015 No No No
Panel C: War Incident
ACD 2015 No No No
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Table 3.12: Significance level of ∆Rit−2 on conflicts (1981-2009)
Panel A: Civil Conflict Incident
GPCP 2.0 GPCP 2.1 GPCP 2.2
ACD 2015 Yes(5%) No No
Panel B: Conflict Onset
ACD 2015 No No No
Panel C: War Incident
ACD 2015 No No No
3.4 Cross-Sectional Dependence
The two-way fixed effects estimator above does not take into account of potential
cross-sectional dependence. However, cross-sectional dependence may arise due to
the fact that rainfall shocks are spatially dependent and conflicts may spill across
borders. Therefore, estimated coefficients in the two-way fixed effects estimator are
expected to be upward biased, which leads to over-rejection of the null hypothesis
if cross-sectional dependence is not controlled for in the panel model.
3.4.1 Are Rainfall shocks and Conflict Cross-Sectionally De-
pendent?
To test if rainfall shocks are cross-sectionally dependent, we apply the cross-sectional
dependence (CD) test of Pesaran (2004). CD test is a simple test to examine error
term cross section dependence in the panel model. In the cross section dependence
literature, spacial dependence test of Moran (1948) and Lagrange Multiplier ap-
proach of Breusch and Pagan (1980) or LM Test are commonly used. However,
there are problems in these tests. For instance, spatial information is required to
construct a spatial weight matrix in the Moran (1948)’s test.12 But, this spatial
12This spatial information could be economic distance information such as trade or output pat-
terns. For more information, please see Baltagi, Song and Koh (2003).
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information is hard to obtain and it is not accurate to use this spatial information
to justify the dependence in the panel model even though spatial weight matrix is
constructed (Pesaran 2004). In the LM test, panel models must have a fixed number
of N and T must be very large. If T is small, LM test is not applicable (Pesaran
2004). However, the CD test is applicable to the panel model that is with short T
and does not require spatial information. Given there is only 28 years in my panel
model, CD test is more suitable for this study. Specifically, the CD test is based on
average of pair-wise correlation coefficients of the OLS residuals in the panel model.
In this study, the CD tests evaluates the null hypothesis that the contemporane-
ous or lagged rainfall shocks are cross sectionally independent. A rejection of the
CD test (at some conventional level of significance) suggests that rainfall shocks are
cross-sectionally dependent.
From Table 3.13, the CD test for the cross-sectional dependence of rainfall
shocks, both their contemporaneous values and lags, can be rejected at the 1% level.
This is not surprising as the literature suggests that rainfall is spatially dependent
(Auffhammer et al. 2013).





The rainfall data is GPCP 2.2. The CD-test is proposed by Pesaran (2004).
In the SSAs, there are significant cross-border conflict spillovers. To demonstrate
this, we follow Bosker and de Ree (2014) to use ACD 2015 conflict dataset and to








The denominator of this index is
∑t=2009
t=1981 cit and represents the total number of con-
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and is summing up the conflict in country i and year t conditional on whether its
any neibhbouring countries have experienced conflicts in t − 3.13 Take Niger as an
example, there are 7 civil conflict incidents from 1981 to 2009 according to ACD
2015 conflict dataset and then
∑t=2009
t=1981 cit is 7. If 6 out of these 7 conflicts were
happening when any Niger’s neighbouring countries had also experienced conflict in




it is 6. Then, the spillover index for Niger is about
0.86 (6/7). This index is ranged from 0 to 1 and captures the conditional probability
that conflict from one country spreads to another. If this index is equal to 1 (0),
this indicates that a civil conflict incident in one country can spill over to other
neighbouring countries with a probability of 1 (0).
For the sake of presentation, we document the result in Figure 3.1 below. Coun-
tries like Benin, Botswana, Gabon, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland and
Tanzania getting -1 in the spillover index and -1 indicates that there is no conflict
from 1981 to 2006 for these countries. The rest of SSA countries has experienced at
least one civil conflict incident from 1981 to 2009 according to ACD 2015 conflict
dataset. For example, Ghana experienced 2 civil conflict incidents (one was in 1981
and another one was in 1983). As neighbouring countries of Ghana (Ivory Coast,
Togo and Burkina Faso ) had not encountered any civil conflict incident three years
before Ghana experienced these two civil conflicts, the spillover index for Ghana is
0. Nearly half countries in SSA that has experienced civil conflicts from 1981 to
2009 scores 0.5 above in the spillover index. Countries like Liberia, Central African
Republic, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Chad,
Nigeria, South Africa and Lesotho score close to or even equal to 1 in the spillover
index. To sum up, it may be common to see conflicts spilling over across border and
countries are cross-sectionally dependent to each other according to the computation
of the spillover index.
13Neighbouring countries are defined as countries share the same border with country i
14Neighbouring countries of Niger are Nigeria, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso and Benin.
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Figure 3.1: Conflict spillover in SSA
Note: -1 means no conflicts; 0 means no spillover effect. Higher spillover index in country i indicates
conflicts from neighboring countries spillover to country i with a higher probability.
In the presence of cross-sectional dependence, it will be more appropriate to






ift + vit, i = 1...N, t = 1...T (3.3)
where ft represents the set of unobserved common factors and γi represents the
set of factor loadings possibly unique to each country i. vit is the idiosyncratic
error term. The term γ′ift represents what is known as interactive fixed effects.
Pesaran (2006) argues that these interactive fixed effects are more suitable than the
additively structured two-way fixed effects, in that they can absorb all confounding
country permanent differences, as well as common (i.e. macroeconomic) factors and
country-specific policy shocks regardless of their stationarity properties and whether
they have impact countries homogeneously or heterogeneously.
Interactive fixed effects are powerful. They can absorb all confounding coun-
try permanent differences, common (i.e. macroeconomic) factors and country-
specific policy shocks regardless of their stationarity properties and their homo-
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geneous/heterogeneous impacts on countries (Chudik, Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011;
Chudik and Pesaran, 2013). They may also address the confounding influence of
dependence across space (Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011), which, in our context, may
arise because of spatial dependence in weather patterns and therefore in rainfall
shocks, or because of cross-border conflict spillovers.15 Importantly, the CCE es-
timator subsumes the two-way fixed effects estimator as a special case (Pesaran,
2006). Therefore, panel regressions with interactive fixed effects will be consistent
if the two-way fixed effects estimator is consistent, and may still be so even if the
two-way fixed effects estimator is not.
To estimate β′k in a panel regression with interactive fixed effects, we employ the
Common Correlated Effects (CCE) estimator of Pesaran (2006). The CCE approach
is based on the idea that the observable covariates of the model (in this case, yit,
∆Rit−k) are correlated with the unobserved factors captured by the vector ft in Eq.
(3.3). Because of their correlation, we may use the observable covariates to construct
proxies for ft and control for it.
To do so, observe that the covariates (i.e. yit, ∆Rit−k) have both cross-sectional
and time variation, while unobservable factors (i.e. ft) only have time variation.
Thus, we first transform the observable covariates into variables that only have time





i=1 ∆Rit/N . Then, we use these cross-sectional averages as proxies for ft
by including these averages as control variables. Pesaran (2006) shows that under
mild regularity conditions,16 β′k can be estimated using the pooled mean-group OLS
estimator. He also shows that inference can be implemented using the approach of
Newey and West (1986) to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelated standard
errors.17
15To appreciate how cross-sectional dependence can be captured by interactive fixed effects,
consider an event in time t. This could be a macroeconomic event, or an event arising from a
country. Different countries are exposed differently to this event, as reflected by each country’s
factor loading. However, as all countries are affected by it, although with varying intensities, this
unobserved event would cause the countries to be cross-sectionally dependent.
16For these conditions, see page 972 to 975 in Pesaran (2006).
17The CCE estimator requires both large N and T . Through a Monte Carlo exercise, Pesaran
(2006) shows that the CCE estimator works well with N=30 and T=20. This is easily satisfied by
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3.4.2 CCE Estimation Results
The conclusion in the previous section about the effect of rainfall shocks on conflicts
is based on the conventional two-way fixed effect panel model as MMS that overlooks
the problem of cross-sectionally dependence arising from spatial weather pattern
and conflict spillovers. Therefore, we change our estimator from two-way fixed
effect model to CCE estimator that is designed to tackle cross-sectional dependence
while the observational years is between 1981 and 2009 with the same observational
countries as MMS to study the effect of rainfall shocks on conflicts. Details about
results from CCE estimation are shown in the Panel A, Table 22 of Appendix and
then significant level of these estimates are summarized in Table 3.14 and 3.15. As
we can see, the effect of lagged rainfall shock ∆Rit−2 on war incident is statistically
significant at 10% level.
Table 3.14: Significant level of rainfall shocks on conflicts in CCE (1981-2009)
GPCP 2.2 and ACD 2015
Civil conflict incident conflict onset War incident
∆Rit No No No
∆Rit−1 No No No
Table 3.15: Significant level of rainfall shocks on conflicts in CCE (1981-2009)
GPCP 2.2 and ACD 2015
Civil conflict incident conflict onset War incident
∆Rit No No No
∆Rit−1 No No No
∆Rit−2 No No Yes(10%)
our sample of N=41 and T=29. However, Totty (2017) reports that the CCE would produce nearly
identical t-statistics with or without bootstrapping. Therefore, we decide to report Newey-West
robust standard errors in this paper.
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3.5 The Functional Form of Rainfall
In MMS, the rainfall variable that enters into the econometric model of conflict is
rainfall shock, which is defined as the growth in rainfall. This specification of rainfall
has been a subject of much debate. For example, Ciccone (2011) argues that the
relationship between rainfall and conflicts is spurious when the rainfall functional
form is rainfall shocks as MMS due to the property of mean reversion in the rainfall
data and suggests to use log rainfall to address the problem of mean reversion.18
Moreover, Dell, Jones and Olken (2014) and Hidalgo et al. (2010) suggest to use
rainfall functional form of mean deviation in order to address substantial variations
arising from extreme weather.
In the baseline, as MMS, rainfall shocks are our main regressor. Here, we consider
using different functional forms of rainfall. First, we consider using the log of rainfall,
denoted by logRit, Second, we consider the mean deviation of rainfall (MdRit),





where Rit is same as before as rainfall level for country i and year t, R̄ and σ are
the mean and standard deviation of rainfall for country i in the whole observational
years (1981-2009).
Table 3.16: Significant level of log(rainfall) on conflicts in CCE
GPCP 2.2 and ACD 2015 (1981-2009)
Civil conflict incident conflict onset War incident
log(Rit) No No No
log(Rit−1) No No No
18Mean reversion of rainfall data implies that there is a long run equilibrium in the rainfall data
and temporarily deviation from the mean at any period will return to normal in the future. In
other words, a negative (positive) rainfall shock in year t is followed by positive (negative) rainfall
shock in the future.
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Table 3.17: Significant level of log(rainfall) on conflicts in CCE
GPCP 2.2 and ACD 2015 (1981-2009)
Civil conflict incident conflict onset War incident
log(Rit) No No No
log(Rit−1) No No No
log(Rit−2) No No Yes(10%)
Table 3.18: Significant level of mean deviation rainfall on conflicts in CCE
GPCP 2.2 and ACD 2015 (1981-2009)
Civil conflict incident conflict onset War incident
MdRit No No No
MdRit−1 No No No
Table 3.19: Significant level of mean deviation rainfall on conflicts in CCE
GPCP 2.2 and ACD 2015 (1981-2009)
Civil conflict incident conflict onset War incident
MdRit No No No
MdRit−1 No No No
MdRit−2 Yes(10%) No Yes(10%)
We document all the details about estimates of the effect of rainfall when the
estimator is CCE and the main regressors are log and mean deviation rainfall in
Table 22 and summarize the significant levels of these estimates in Table 3.16 to
3.19. As we can see, the effect of time-lagged two rainfall in log and mean deviation
forms remain statistically significant at 10% level on civil conflict incident and war
incident.
Furthermore, we find that the difference between estimated coefficients in CCE
estimator (Table 3.16-3.19) with different function forms (log and mean deviation)
and the ones in traditional two-way fixed effect panel model (Table 3.10-3.12) is
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small. This may indicate that the bias due to cross-sectional dependence in the panel
model is small. However, the CCE estimator is more suitable than the traditional
two-way fixed effect panel model to understand the link between rainfall and conflict
even though the role of cross-sectional dependence may be trivial.
3.6 Conclusion
In their seminal work, Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) have shown that rain-
fall shocks have a statistically significant effect in increasing the incidence of civil
conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Their result was obtained based on the ACD 2004
conflict and GPCP 2.0 rainfall datasets, which had since been revised twice. In this
article, we explore if the statistical significance of their impact estimates is robust
to using the revised rainfall and conflict datasets. For the same set of 41 countries
and 1981-1999 period considered by Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004), we find
that using the most recently revised rainfall and conflict datasets (i.e. GPCP 2.2
and ACD 2015) will drive out the statistically significance of rainfall shocks for civil
conflict, civil war incidence, and civil conflict onset. The statistical insignificance
of these estimates remains even as we consider various functional forms for rainfall,
extend the dataset to 2009, and include a second lag of rainfall shocks as a regressor.
Finally, we find that there is cross-sectional dependence in rainfall shocks and con-
flict. However, even when we take cross-sectional dependence into account, it does
not restore the statistical significance of rainfall shocks seen in Miguel, Satyanath
and Sergenti (2004). This calls into question if rainfall shocks do affect civil conflict
in sub-Saharan Africa, as there is no evidence to suggest that this is true once the
latest rainfall and conflict datasets are used.
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Table 20: Rainfall shocks on Conflict from 1981-1999 (Two-way Fixed Effects)

















































































































































The intercept and observation number are not reported. Country fixed effect and country specific time
trend are included. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in the parentheses.
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
Table 21: Rainfall Shocks on Conflict from 1981-2009 (Two-way Fixed Effects)






























































































































The intercept is not reported.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in the parentheses.
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
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Table 22: Rainfall on Conflict from 1981-2009 (CCE estimator)
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7)














































































































The intercept is not reported.Robust standard errors clustered
at the country level are in the parentheses. ***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
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Chapter 4






School of Economics, University of Adelaide
Abstract: This study investigates the new productivity-enhancing technology in
agriculture– the adoption of Genetically-Modified (GM) soybeans– on internal con-
flicts. A conceptual model is constructed to show that an improvement in agricul-
tural productivity induced by adoption of GM soybeans can reduce land value and
mitigate land-related conflicts. Additionally, we employ the Difference-in-Differences
(DD) estimation to capture variations from: 1) a policy experiment on the commer-
cial legalization of GM soybean cultivation in 2003 in Brazil and 2) land suitability
of cultivating this crop and examine the effect of these variations on land conflicts.
Results in the DD estimation show that GM soybean cultivation is negatively associ-





In developing countries, internal conflicts are closely related to agricultural shocks.
One possible explanation is that the incomes of developing countries tend to be
highly dependent on the agricultural sector (Gollin 2010). Since conflicts are found
to be associated with low incomes (Collier and Hoeffler 1998), a negative shock to the
agricultural sector may give rise to conflicts in agriculturally dependent countries
(Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti 2004).1 As such, technologies that lead to an
improvement in agricultural productivity, and therefore income, may reduce the
incidence of internal conflicts in developing countries.2
In this paper, we address the question of whether productivity-enhancing tech-
nologies in agriculture can help to mitigate internal conflicts. To do so, we exploit a
policy experiment in Brazil – the legalization of Genetically-Modified (GM) soybean
cultivation – to study how the adoption of a productivity-enhancing agricultural
technology may affect land conflicts. In 2003, the Brazilian federal government le-
galized the cultivation of GM soybeans that are more robust and therefore more
productive than traditional soybeans. Since the inception of this policy, the adop-
tion rate of GM soybeans in soybean harvest areas in Brazil rose quickly from 46.4%
in 2005 to 93% in 2016 (IBGE 2006; USDA 2016). According to FAO (2013), Brazil
is the second largest soybean producer in the world with a production of 86.8 million
metric tons in 2013. After the legalization of GM soybean cultivation in 2003, Brazil
has also become the second biggest GM crop producer in the world with 44.2 million
hectares of land being used to cultivate GM crops (James 2015).
Over the past decades, Brazil has experienced numerous internal conflicts asso-
ciated with land invasions. According to Girardi (2015), there have been over 9,400
1Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) show that a reduction in agricultural income that is
approximated by a decrease in rainfall leads to a higher conflict likelihood in countries where
incomes heavily rely on the agricultural sector.
2The enhancement of agricultural productivity can expand income and sustain long-run eco-
nomic growth (Gollin, Parente and Rogerson 2002; Self and Grabowski 2007). This is because,
according to Johnston (1951), improvement of agricultural productivity can release labor from
the agriculture sector to the non-agriculture sectors and encourage capital formation. Thereby,
structural transformation and industrialization can be initiated (Johnston and Mellor 1961). Con-
sequently, agricultural productivity improvement can increase income.
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land conflicts in Brazil, involving several million people and over 1,300 deaths. Our
contribution is to show that the adoption of GM soybean cultivation could help
to mitigate this problem, and thus, the GM technologies in agriculture could help
to reduce internal conflicts in agriculturally dependent countries in general. The
idea is that the adoption of GM soybeans would help to increase agricultural pro-
ductivity by improving labor and land use efficiency (Bustos et al. 2016).3 Given
that the demand for agricultural products is inelastic (Van Driel, Nadall and Zee-
lenberg 1997), agricultural productivity enhancement would in turn lead to a fall in
agricultural prices and therefore in agricultural land value (Iyigun, Nunn and Qian,
2015). In the context of Brazil, Barrows, Sexton and Zilberman (2014b) show that
the agricultural productivity improvement arising from the commercial legalization
of GM soybean cultivation is followed by a decline in the soybean price. If this
causes agricultural land to depreciate as theory suggests,4 and agricultural land is
the reward for winners in land conflicts, then land conflicts could decline in major
soybean cultivation regions once GM soybean cultivation was legalized.
Empirically, we employ the Difference-in-Differences (DD) estimation approach
to examine the effect of GM soybean farming on land conflicts. Our estimation
design makes use of two sources of variations: 1) the legalization of GM soybean
cultivation in 2003 in Brazil, and 2) the cross-sectional differences arising from the
size of suitable land for soybean cultivation in Brazilian states. Specifically, our
approach exploits the legalization of GM soybean cultivation in Brazil as the treat-
ment, where states with large tracts of suitable land for cultivating soybeans are the
treatment group, and states with smaller tracts are the control group. If GM soy-
bean cultivation as an agricultural productivity-enhancing technology is irrelevant
for land conflicts, the policy should not affect land conflicts in both treatment and
control groups differently. However, if it is relevant, land conflicts should be reduced
3Land productivity is improved because GM soybean cropping enables farmers to do double-
cropping (Sharma et al. 2002 and Barrows, Sexton and Zilberman 2014a).
4Huang et al. (2004) provide empirical evidence to show that the prices of agricultural land
that is used for cultivating GM crops decline while the crop prices reduce after the GM crops are
adopted in China.
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in major soybean cultivation states after the legalization of GM soybeans.
Our DD estimation results show that adopting GM soybeans as an agricultural
productivity-enhancing technology can abate land conflicts. Its mitigating impact
on land conflicts is sizable. For example, states that owns 1% more land that is
suitable for growing GM soybeans can reduce land conflicts by about 0.12% after
the legalization of GM soybean cultivation in 2003. Furthermore, a 1% increase in
the size of suitable land for GM soybean cultivation can lessen the number of people
and families participated in land conflicts by about 0.17% and 0.14% respectively.
These results remain robust after placebo tests, confounding factors and different
measures of land suitability are considered in the estimation. Hence, the agricultural
innovation from adopting GM soybean cultivation can alleviate the land conflict
problem and promote economic development.
Our study contributes to the following literature. Firstly, this study is closely
related to the literature about the effect of agricultural productivity-enhancing tech-
nology on conflicts. For example, Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (2015) argue that agricul-
tural productivity improvement due to the adoption of potatoes can reduce conflicts.
Jia (2014) shows that the adoption of potatoes is able to lessen peasant revolts in
historical China.5 Both studies explore the historical event of “The Columbian
Exchange” and establish the impact of this event on economic and political devel-
opment.6 However, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of the
new and ongoing agricultural productivity shocks induced by the cultivation of GM
soybeans on land conflicts.
Secondly, this study links to the literature on the determinants of land con-
flicts. On one hand, the literature suggests that land reforms and the effectiveness
of property right are determinants on land conflicts. For example, Alston, Libecap
5The reason is that potatoes are a drought-resistant crop and the cultivation of this crop can
play a mitigating effect on production loss in the occurrence of extreme weather. In other words,
the adoption of potatoes is able to maintain income growth and enhance the opportunity cost
of participating conflicts. This leads to a reduction in conflicts. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and
Axbard (2016) discuss about the relationship between opportunity cost, income and conflicts.
6Nunn and Qian (2010) provide in-depth discussion about “The Columbian Exchange”. For
more information on its impact on economic development, refer to Nunn and Qian (2011).
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and Schneider (1996) explain that the national land reform implemented by the
National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (or INCRA) helps landless
people in securing land titles, thus reducing land inequality and conflicts in Brazil.
Fetzer and Marden (2017) argue that weak property rights in Brazil increase land
contestability and land conflicts. On the other hand, the literature argues that
economic performance and inequality are sources of land conflicts in Brazil. For
instance, Hidalgo et al. (2010) find that economic conditions approximated by rain-
fall are negatively associated with land conflict incidence in Brazil. Additionally,
social grievance arising from acute land inequality in Brazil can play an important
role in land conflicts (Albertus, Brambor and Ceneviva 2016). This study, however,
examines the determinants of land conflict from the perspective of agricultural de-
velopment. In particular, this study, to the best of our knowledge, is the first study
to attempt to seek a solution for reducing internal conflicts from the perspective of
agricultural productivity improvement induced by the adoption of GM soybeans.
Thirdly, this study is associated with literature on the impact of agricultural pro-
ductivity and innovation on a series of economic consequences. Matsuyama (1992)
and Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002) argue that agricultural productivity im-
provement can sustain economic growth. Kassie, Shiferaw and Muricho (2011) pro-
vide evidence to show that the adoption of high-yield varieties of rice and maize
can substantially reduce poverty in Uganda.7 Emerick et al. (2016) demonstrate
that agricultural innovation in terms of adopting flood-resistant crops can encour-
age farmers to modernize their cultivation practices and increase fertilizer and credit
use. Nunn and Qian (2011) and Andersen, Jensen and Skovsgaard (2016) illustrate
that the adoption of potatoes and heavy plows respectively are positively associated
with urbanization. We differ from these studies by investigating the adoption of
GM soybeans as a source of agricultural productivity enhancement, as well as their
potential role in economic development in terms of conflict reduction.
Lastly, this study contributes to the ongoing and still early discussion about the
7Ravallion and Chen (2007) use China as an example to show that agricultural development
can alleviate poverty.
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effect of agricultural biotechnologies. GM crop cultivation is one of the most debat-
able topics in literature (Gaskell et al. 1999; Hartl and Herrmann 2009; Canavari
and Nayga Jr 2009).8 So far, the literature on agricultural biotechnologies mainly
focuses on yield improvement from the adoption of GM crops (Qaim and Zilberman
2003; Qaim and Traxler 2005). However, studies on the effect of adopting GM crops
on economic development is scarce.9 This study aims to establish and explore the
link between the cultivation of GM crops and economic development.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background
about the cultivation of GM soybeans and land conflicts in Brazil. In particular, Sec-
tion 2 introduces knowledge on GM soybeans and its benefits. Section 3 introduces
the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework includes two parts. Part one
explains how the adoption of GM soybeans can reduce land value. Part two shows
how the reduction of land value in part one can reduce land conflicts. The data
for this study is discussed in Section 4. More importantly, Section 4 explains the
construction of the variable that is used to measure land suitability for cultivating
soybeans in this study. Section 5 discusses the empirical model. Main results are
presented in Section 6 and are followed by robustness checks in Section 7. Section
8 is the conclusion.
4.2 Background
In this section, we offer some background on the benefits of cropping GM soybeans,
GM soybean production and land conflicts in Brazil.
8Huang et al. (2004) discuss the welfare implications of GM cotton in China. Furthermore,
Huang, Pray and Rozelle 2002 and Barrows, Sexton and Zilberman (2014b) offer better insight
into the prospect of GM crops.
9The exception is Bustos et al. (2016) who investigate the effect of GM soybean adoption on
urbanization in Brazil.
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4.2.1 The Benefits of Cultivating GM Soybeans
Genetically-Modified crops refer to Genetically-Engineered or transgenic crops. These
are crops that incorporate genes from other species to achieve desirably agricultural
traits. There are three main types of GM technologies – herbicide tolerant, insect
resistant or strait traits – which are mainly applied to soybean, maize, cotton and
canola crops. GM soybean seeds were initially released commercially in the US
in 1996 and are characterized by a gene from the soil bacterium Agrobacterium
Tumefaciens (Qaim and Traxler 2005). In turn, GM soybean cultivation is com-
patible with using, Glyphosate, the broad-spectrum herbicide.10 This herbicide is
safer to consumers and farmers, more environmental friendly and more efficient in
terms of weed eradication than other herbicides that are used in traditional soybean
cultivation (Qaim 2009).11 As Glyphosate is not applicable to traditional soybean
cultivation, there are several advantages in cultivating GM soybeans over the culti-
vation of traditional soybeans.12
Firstly, the cultivation of GM soybeans would result in improving land produc-
tivity. In traditional soybean cultivation, if farmers apply the tillage method in
land preparation, they must till soil repeatedly to remove weeds.13 In GM soybean
cultivation, farmers can take advantage of Glyphosate, a broader-spectrum herbi-
cide that is compatible with GM soybean cropping. In doing so, GM soybean can
be seeded directly along with the use of Glyphosate for weed control, and tillage
10This herbicide is strictly regulated by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
is registered in June 1986 by EPA. The toxicity level is considered to be second lowest by EPA.
WHO (2010) also make similar categorization in the International Classification of Pesticides for
Glyphosate.
11Many studies provide empirical evidence to show that, compared to traditional soybean culti-
vation, growing GM soybean can significantly substitute the use of highly toxic herbicides (Qaim
and Traxler 2005). This can be beneficial for farmers, consumers and animals (Huang et al. 2003;
Cerdeira and Duke 2006). Additionally, GM soybean cultivation can also lead to a decrease in
release of greenhouse gas emission and preserve cropland (Barrows, Sexton and Zilberman 2014b;
Brookes and Barfoot 2015).
12The difference between GM and conventional soybean cultivation is herbicide use only. If
conventional soybeans were grown along with GM soybeans, their performance would be identical
as long as the presence of weeds and other related adverse factors are considered in the conventional
soybean plantation (Rocha and Villalobos 2013). For climate, land and soil level that are needed
during cultivation, GM soybeans and traditional soybeans are the same.
13Otherwise, unwanted weeds would crowd out other crops and absorb water and nutrients that
are needed by other crops.
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is not required (Rocha and Villalobos 2013). Consequently, the cultivation of GM
soybeans saves time and enables farmers to practice the double-cropping of GM soy-
beans in the same piece of land, which is often infeasible with traditional soybean
farming (Sharma et al. 2002; Barrows, Sexton and Zilberman 2014a).14
Secondly, the cultivation of GM soybeans can help to enhance labor productivity.
Specifically, by using Glyphosate, a broader-spectrum herbicide, the process of weed
eradication will be simplified and less ongoing effort on weed management will be
required (Qaim and Traxler, 2005). For example, Huang et al. (2002) show that
GM technology adopters can save about 67% of labor time in weed management.
Bustos et al. (2016) find that, due to the legalization of GM soybean cultivation in
2003, soybean production per worker in Brazil rises from fewer than 100 tons in the
1980s to 300 tons in 2010.
Thirdly, GM soybean farmers are able to enjoy higher yields than traditional
soybean cultivators. If traditional soybean planters apply the tillage method during
land preparation, plowing the land repeatedly can cause low outputs as consecutive
plowing can stifle the positive characteristics of organic contents, destabilize the
structure of soil and increase soil erosion (Rocha and Villalobos 2013). However,
GM soybean cultivation does not present these problems as GM soybean adopters
can avoid the tillage method and use the direct seed method in the weed manage-
ment, which is advantageous in preserving soil conditions and augmenting crop yield
(Motavalli et al. 2004). Farmers who cultivate GM soybeans can also double-crop
in the same piece of land and this can significantly increase crop outputs (Trigo
and Cap 2004).15 Therefore, GM soybean cultivators can result in higher yields
(Benthem 2013).16
14The practice of double-cropping is planting two, instead of just one, crops in the same piece of
land in different growing seasons within a year. Farmers can produce one crop in the early season
and another one in the late season per year. In double-cropping, crop combinations can be wheat
and soybeans or only soybeans in both growing seasons. For more detail, please see Rocha and
Villalobos (2013).
15Trigo and Cap (2004) provide empirical evidence to show that double-cropping induced by the
adoption of GM technologies can increase crop outputs by about 3 times in Argentina.
16Benthem (2013) used data from two large soybean cultivators in Brazil–Mato Grosso and
Parana and found that soybean yields increased by at least 9 percent on average in 2010 after the
legalization of GM soybean cultivation. Qaim and Zilberman (2003) and Qaim (2003) focused on
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Finally, production costs can be reduced by switching from cultivating traditional
soybeans to GM soybeans. If traditional soybeans planters choose direct seeding in
weed management, they have to purchase costly chemicals for weed removal. How-
ever, GM soybean cultivators would require less chemicals due to its efficiency in
weed eradication and therefore incur lower production costs (Qaim 2009). Quantita-
tively, Qaim and Traxler (2005) argue that GM technologies can reduce production
costs by about 10%, which is approximately equivalent to a saving of USD 7.57 per
ton of soybean production. Moreover, fertilizer input is lower in GM soybean culti-
vation. In Brazil, James et al. (2010) reveals that the production costs in terms of
fertilizer use in GM soybean plantation is about 50% less than conventional soybean
cropping and that the total direct production costs for GM soybean cultivation are
about 5.1% lower than conventional soybean cropping.
4.2.2 GM Soybean Production in Brazil
Traditionally, Brazil has been a large producer of soybeans. According to FAO
(2013), Brazil is the second largest soybean producer in the world with 86.8 million
metric tons, or 30% of global production, produced in 2013.17 However, traditional
soybeans are significantly replaced by GM soybeans. According to Figure 4.1, GM
soybeans account for 83% of soybean harvest area. This high replacement rate is
due to the policy change on legalizing GM soybean cultivation.
another type of GM crop Bacillus thuringiensis (bt) cotton and show that GM cotton improved
yields remarkably in India.
17USA is the biggest soybean producer in the world and about 108 million metric tons were
produced in 2013.
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Figure 4.1: Comparison in harvest area
(GM vs conventional soybeans)
Note: Data is extracted from James (2015)
In 2003, commercial farming of GM soybeans was legalized in Brazil.18 Following
this, a large proportion of traditional soybeans production was replaced by the
production of GM soybeans. For example, GM soybean seeds cover 46.4% of Brazil’s
soybean cultivation in 2005, just two years after the policy was in place (IBGE 2006).
This figure rises rapidly to 85% in 2011-2012 (USDA 2012), and 93% in 2016-2017
(USDA 2016). Brazil has now become a major GM crop cultivator in the world. As
Table 4.1 shows, Brazil is the second biggest GM crop cultivator in the world, with
44.2 million hectares of land harvests being GM crops (James, 2015).19
18Initially, the Brazilian government announced the Law 10.688 which only allowed one harvest
season. In 2005, the Brazilian government passed a second law, Bio-Safety Law, and this resulted
in large scale production and consumption of GM soybeans.
19James (2015) also reveals that 28 countries have adopted GM crops in 2015.
These 28 countries are USA(70.9), Brazil(44.2), Argentina(24.5), India(11.6), Canada(11.0),
China(3.7), Paraguay(3.6), South Africa(2.3), Uruguay(1.4), Bolivia(1.1), Philippines(0.7), Aus-
tralia(0.7), Burkina Faso(0.4), Myanmar(0.3), Mexico(0.1), Spain(0.1), Colombia(0.1), Sudan(0.1),
Honduras(<0.05), Chile(<0.05), Portugal(<0.05), Vietnam(<0.05), Czech Republic(<0.05),
Slovakia(<0.05), Costa Rica(<0.05), Bangladesh(<0.05), Romania(<0.05). The figures in bracket
are harvest area (unit is million hectares).
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Table 4.1: Top 10 GM crops cultivation countries in 2015
Rank Country
GM crop cultivation size









9 South Afirca 2.3
10 Uruguay 1.4
Note: Data is extracted from James (2015)
4.2.3 Land-related Conflicts in Brazil
Land-related conflicts are severe in Brazil. According to FAO (2005), Brazil is one of
the most unequal countries in the world in terms of land distribution. For instance,
more than two-thirds of total arable land are owned by 3.5% of landlords (Hidalgo
et al., 2010), and the Gini coefficient of landholding consistently exceeds 0.8, which
is one of the highest in the world (Albertus, Brambor and Ceneviva, 2016). The
severity of land inequality is accompanied by land conflicts in Brazil. According to
CPT (2014) and Girardi (2015), there are over 9,400 land conflicts in 2014, which
involve more than 1.4 million families and several million individuals. Figure 4.2
shows the number of land conflicts in Brazil from 1985 to 2015. As we can see
in Figure 4.2, the number of land conflict increases remarkably from 1985 to 2002.
Particularly, it reached the peak in 2002. Conversely, the number of land conflict
drops dramatically after legalizing GM soybean cultivation in 2003.
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Figure 4.2: Number of land conflicts in Brazil
As a result of land conflicts, they resulted in the deaths of more than 1,300 peo-
ple over this period (1985-2015). Moreover, there are numerous social movements
and national land reforms in Brazil due to the severity of land conflicts. For ex-
ample, the Landless Workers Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem
Terra or MST) is a highly active social movement on land invasions (Hammond and
Rossi 2013). The purpose of this organization is to organize or hire unemployed
and landless farmworkers or poor rural people to take over private or government
idle land collectively. Problems with land conflicts have also forced the Brazilian
government to initiate national land reform by establishing the National Institute
of Colonisation and Agrarian Reform or INCRA to help squatters or landless peo-
ple secure land titles legally. For example, Robles (2018) illustrates three national
land reforms across Brazil. The first one is Sarney’s Agrarian Reform from 1985 to
1989. The second one is Collor-Franco’s Agrarian Reform from 1990 to 1994. The
last one is Cardoso’s Agrarian Reform from 1995 to 2002. These agrarian reforms
successfully help many landless people resolving land disputes and possessing land
legally.
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The Role of GM Soybean Cultivation on Land Conflicts in Brazil
Figure 4.3: Control vs Treatment Group
Figure 4.4: Amapa Figure 4.5: Pernambuco
Note: Vertical axis is the number of land conflict (in log) and horizontal axis is year.
Implementing the policy of legalizing GM soybean cultivation in 2003 in Brazil may
play a nontrivial role in the reduction of land conflicts. To better understand its
impact on different Brazilian states, we select a state from the control and treatment
group.20 For example, the state of Amapa represents the control group and the state
of Pernambuco is the treatment group.
As we can see in Figure 4.4 and 4.5 above, the same policy of legalizing GM
soybean cultivation in 2003 affects the control (Amapa) and treatment (Pernam-
buco) group differently. Specifically, Figure 4.4 shows that Amapa experienced a
remarkably rise in the number of land conflicts after 2003. Conversely, there is
a steady decline in the state of Pernambuco after GM soybeans were legalized in
2003. Through the comparison between the control and treatment group, the policy
impact is heterogeneous in terms of land conflicts.
4.3 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we provide the conceptual framework to explain how the adoption of
GM soybeans lessens land conflicts. In the first part of the conceptual framework,
we follow Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (2015) in using a simple model to demonstrate
20The construction and distinction between the treatment and control group are discussed below
in Section 4.4.1.
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that the productivity-enhancing technology induced by the GM soybean cultivation
can reduce agricultural land value. In the second part of the conceptual framework,
we show that the reduction of land value driven by the adoption of GM soybeans can
reduce land conflicts, if agricultural land is the return for winners in land conflicts.
4.3.1 The Effect of GM Soybean Cultivation on Land Value
The adoption of GM soybeans can improve agricultural productivity by enhancing
land and labor efficiency in the GM soybean cultivation. We follow Iyigun, Nunn
and Qian (2015) and use a simple two-sector model to show that the agricultural
productivity improvement induced by the adoption of GM soybeans can reduce agri-
cultural land value. The key insight is that the adoption of GM soybeans can reduce
soybean price (Barrows, Sexton and Zilberman 2014b). Since agricultural products
are price inelastic, the price reduction would be greater than demand expansion for
agricultural products (Van Driel, Nadall and Zeelenberg 1997). Farmers own land.
They use it to produce agricultural goods and sell them for income at market price.
This implies that agricultural land value is reflected by soybean price levels. Thus,
as soybean price decreases due to the adoption of GM soybeans, the value of agri-
cultural land is reduced. The reduction of agricultural land value can lessen land
conflicts if agricultural land is the return for winners in land conflicts.
Impact of Adoption of GM Soybeans on Land Value
Following the simple two-sector model from Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (2015), there
are two sectors: agriculture (A) and manufacturing (M) sectors and two players:
landlords and landless workers in our model. The production of these two sectors







where: A∗A ≡ AAN1−α
YM = AMLM (4.2)
In Eq.(4.1) and (4.2), YA and YM are production from the agriculture and manu-
facturing sector. LA is labor input for the agriculture sector and LM is labor input
for the manufacturing sector. Total labor supply is normalized to one.21 A∗A is total
factor productivity in the agriculture sector and consists of agricultural technology
development (AA) and the total fixed supply of arable land (N). As N is in A
∗
A,
this can capture land use efficiency. For GM soybean cultivation, A∗A is enhanced as
GM soybean cultivation can encourage farmers do double-cropping. α is the output
elasticity of labor in the agriculture sector. AM is the total factor productivity in the
manufacturing sector. There are some differences between output setups in Eq.(4.1)
and (4.2). Firstly, land is required only in the agriculture but not in the manufac-
turing sector. Secondly, as the supply of land is fixed, marginal product of labor
in the agricultural sector is decreasing whereas it is constant in the manufacturing
sector.
Labor is perfectly mobile across the two sectors and the wage w is in the compet-
itive equilibrium. Additionally, w is decided by the marginal productivity of labor
in the manufacturing sector:
w = AM (4.3)
The price of agriculture products is PA and the price of manufacturing products is







A − wLA (4.4)
From Eq.(4.4), we can see that the landlord uses the land to produce agriculture




A and sells them at the price of PA. The cost
of producing these agriculture products is labor cost wLA. The difference between
income and cost is π, which is equal to the value of owning land. Take the first order
21LA + LM = 1
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A = w (4.5)









Eq.(4.6) is the equilibrium labor in the agriculture sector, which is a function of PA,

























s. t.PACA + CM = w
(4.9)
where CA and CM are consumption of agricultural and manufacturing goods. σ is
the elasticity of demand for agricultural products. Taking the first order-condition




σ = PA (4.10)
We assume that the goods market is in a competitive environment, therefore aggre-
22In order to get Eq.(4.10), we also need to take the first order condition with respect to CM .
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gate production is equal to aggregate consumption:
CA = YA (4.11)

































We can simplify Eq.(4.14) further and obtain the equilibrium price of agriculture
products P ∗A as :









From Eq.(4.15), we can see that P ∗A is a function of AM , A
∗
A, σ and α. We can also




A above to replace

















































We then use Eq.(4.16), Eq.(4.15) and Eq.(4.4) to construct the equilibrium land
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In Eq.(4.17) above, the equilibrium land value π∗ is a function of A∗A, AM ,σ and
α. Many empirical studies show that the demand for agriculture products is inelastic
(Tobin 1950 and Tolley, Wang and Fletcher 1969).23 This means that σ is greater
than 0 but small than 1. This implies that an increase in agriculture productivity
(A∗A ↑ ) can result in a reduction of land value ( π∗ ↓ ).24
4.3.2 Impact of Adoption of GM Soybeans on Land Con-
flicts
The simple two-sector model above shows that the value of agricultural land is
depreciated when agricultural productivity is enhanced (Iyigun, Nunn and Qian
2015). As the adoption of GM soybeans can improve agricultural productivity by
increasing land and labor efficiency during cultivation, the agricultural land value
can fall. In this section, we use similar settings from the gun-or-butter model or
the appropriate-or-production model from Powell (1993), Grossman (1994) and Ace-
moglu et al. (2012) to demonstrate that land conflicts can be deterred when land
value is decreased. Specifically, we presume landless workers can spend effort on il-
legal activities for seizing the contestable land from the landlord. If landless workers
win, the return of a land conflict is land itself. Therefore, landless workers solve the
23The price elasticity of agriculture products is between 0.2 and 0.8. For more discussion, please
seeVan Driel, Nadall and Zeelenberg (1997).
24 1−σ





P (m)π∗ − l(m) (4.18)
where m is the effort spent on taking land in conflicts by the landless people; P (m)
is the probability of winning in land conflicts and P (.) is an increasing and concave
function; l(m) is the cost to win in land conflicts and l(.) is an increasing and convex
function. The landless worker’s problem is to choose the optimal level of m such
that he can win the π∗ ( the land) in conflicts. Taking the first order condition with





From Eq.(4.19), we can see the negative relationship between land value and land
conflict likelihood. If the value of agricultural land is diminished (π∗ ↓), this results
in less effort spent on taking land (m ↓) and reduced probability of land conflicts
(P (m) ↓).
The conceptual framework in this sector explains that productivity-enhancing
technology induced by the adoption of GM soybeans can devalue agricultural land.
This would reduce land conflicts if land is the winning price for winners.
4.4 Data
Our dataset consists of a panel of 27 Brazilian states from 1985 to 2015.25 We
consider the following dependent variables (in log form) that capture various aspects
of land conflicts: the number of land conflicts (log(Conflict)), the number of people
and families who participated in land conflicts (log(People)) and log(Family)) and
the hectares of land affected by land conflicts (log(Area)).
Our main independent variable is the interaction of two variables (see Section
4.5): 1) Ipostt , the GM soybean policy treatment dummy and 2) log(SoybeanSuitability),
a measure of exposure to this treatment. log(SoybeanSuitability) measures the size
25One of these states, Distrito Federal, is a federative units.
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of suitable land (in log form) for cultivating soybeans at the state level. A larger
value in log(SoybeanSuitability) indicates that the state has a larger land area that is
suitable for cultivating soybeans. Thus, log(SoybeanSuitability) reflects the capacity
of the state to produce soybeans.
Our main control variables are the log of rainfall (log(Rainfall)), the log of popu-
lation (log(Population)), and the Gini coefficient. Summary statistics are provided
in Table 4.2 below.












log(SoybeanSuitability) 837 10.01 3.11 0 12.98
log(Conflict) 810 2.84 1.13 0 5.41
log(People) 774 9.22 1.59 1.61 12.57
log(Family) 676 7.58 1.41 0 10.76
log(Area) 751 10.64 1.99 3.61 16.00
log(Rainfall) 805 7.27 0.37 6.07 8.11
log(Population) 837 15 1.16 11.28 17.54
Gini 830 0.56 0.04 .42 0.67
4.4.1 Soybean Suitability
We consider Nunn and Qian (2011) to construct the land suitability variable, log(soy-
beansuitability), to capture the difference in soybean cultivation in Brazilian states.
The data on land suitability for cultivating soybeans (or log(soybeansuitability))
is taken from The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)’s GAEZ project, ver-
sion 3.0, where the GAEZ project provides measures on suitability for cultivating a
variety of crops including soybeans.26
The FAO constructs the measures of land suitability for cultivating a crop based
on the following procedure. Firstly, the FAO collects information about growing
characteristics of the crop in question.27 In particular, they obtain information
26The GAEZ project provides measures of cultivation suitability for the crop in question during
different periods. These periods are 1960-1990, 2020-2029, 2050-2059 and 2080-2089. 1960-1990
is the baseline period. We follow Nunn and Qian (2011) to use the baseline period in our main
estimation and the 2020-2029 period in the robustness check.
27The information about the growing characteristics of the crop includes length of growth cycle,
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from agronomic literature and agricultural research stations about the crop under
consideration to determine what physical environment conditions are essential for
its cultivation.
Secondly, the FAO’s GAEZ project assesses the physical environment in the
global coverage. Specifically, the FAO splits the entire globe into 2.2 million grid
cells, which is about six kilometers by fifty-six kilometers each. Then, the FAO
collects data about climate,28 land features and soil characteristics in each grid
cell.29 Then, climatic conditions such as moisture and temperature levels are as-
sessed against minimum requirements for growing the crop under consideration in
each grid cell and the cell becomes unsuitable to cultivate the crop if the climatic
conditions are not met. If this minimum requirement is met, the GAEZ project takes
land and soil conditions into account to further determine cultivation suitability for
the given crop in the given grid cell.
Thirdly, a series of assumptions about irrigation methods and input intensity
are considered. For instant, the GAEZ project can estimate the potential yields
when the irrigation system is rain-fed and when the intensity of input level is high,
medium or low.30 In this study, we select the rain-fed irrigation method with the
input intensity at intermediate as Nunn and Qian (2011).
At this stage, all of this information is combined with the assumptions mentioned
above to determine the constraint-free crop yields or the maximum possible yield
for the crop in question. Then, the GAEZ project estimates the suitability in the
chosen geographical level for the crop as a percentage of the maximum possible yield
that can be achieved in the chosen geographical level.
length of yield formation period, maximum rate of photosynthesis and so on. The user’s guide of
Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ v 3.0) provides more discussion about this.
28The climatic data is from Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia. The GAEZ
project considers nine variables from the climatic database. These nine variables are precipitation,
frequency of wet days, mean temperature, diurnal (daily) temperature range, vapor pressure, cloud
cover, sunshine, ground-frost frequency, and wind speed.
29Land characteristics are types of land. They are farmland, cropland, pasture and rangeland.
This data in each cell is from the FAO’s Digital Soil Map of the World. Some soil characteristics
are drainage, texture of soil or soil erosion. Information about soils is obtained from the GTOPO30
Database. This database is constructed by the U.S. Geological Survey EROS Data Center.
30Other irrigation methods in the GAEZ project are the sprinkler, gravity, and drip irrigation
systems.
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Finally, the GAEZ project produces eight mutually exclusive classes in regards
to the suitability of the land in different geographic levels for growing the crop
in question. These classes are constructed on the basis of the percentage of the
maximum yield estimated by the GAEZ project that can be achieved in the selected
geographic levels. The eight land classes and their associated percentage of the
maximum yield are: (i) Very High (85-100%), (ii) High (70-84%), (iii) Good (55-
69%), (IV) Medium (40-54%), (V) Moderate (25-39%), (VI) Marginal (10-24%),
(VII) Very Marginal ( 0-9%, but 0 is exclusive in this class), (VIII) Not Suitable (
0%).
Following a similar approach as Nunn and Qian (2011), we define suitable land
for soybean cultivation as land that is classified as “Medium”, “Good”, “High”, and
“Very High”. In other words, land is suitable for soybean cultivation if the land can
achieve 40% or above the maximum yield of the soybean crop as estimated by the
GAEZ project. Our variable log(SoybeanSuitability),31 therefore, measures (in log)
the size of suitable land for cultivating soybeans at the state level. In our robustness
checks, we vary this 40% cut-off point to 25% or 55%, and show that our conclusion
about the impact of legalization of GM soybean cultivation on land conflicts is not
sensitive to various selections of cut-off values that define the land suitability for
cultivating soybeans (or log(SoybeanSuitability)).
31The unit of SoybeanSuitability is square kilometer.
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Figure 4.6: Land suitability for cultivating soybean in Brazil
Notes:1=not suitable+ very marginal; 2=marginal; 3=moderate;
4=medium; 5=good; 6=high; 7=very high.
Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of suitable land for cropping soybeans at the
state level (or log(SoybeanSuitability)) based on the assessment by the GAEZ project.
States that are shaded in darker colors are those that have larger tracts of suitable
land for cultivating soybeans. Given that each state owns different sizes of suitable
land for soybean cultivation, the policy on commercial legalization of of GM soybean
cultivation in 2003 would affect each state differently. For example, the states in
Northeastern and Southeastern regions would benefit more than the ones in the
Northern regions from this policy change. This is because, according to Figure
4.6, the Northeastern and Southeastern regions are more productive in soybean
production than the Northern region is as the former owns more land that is suitable
for growing soybeans. We will exploit this cross-sectional differences in the size
of suitable land for soybean cultivation for our Difference-in-Differences approach
discussed in Section 4.5 below.
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The Relationship between Land Suitability Measure and Production for
Soybeans
To examine the validity of log(SoybeanSuitability), our measure of land suitability
for cultivating soybeans, we explore the relationship between log(SoybeanSuitability)
and the production of soybeans. To do this, we collect data on soybean production
from 1989 to 2010 for each Brazilian states from the Brazilian Institute of Geography
and Statistics (BIGS) and present the relationship between log(SoybeanSuitability)
provided by the GAEZ project and the soybean production in Brazilian states from
1989 to 2010 in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Soybean production and soybean suitability in Brazilian states
In Figure 4.7, we plot the average soybean production (in log form) from 1989 to
2010 against log(SoybeanSuitability) for each state. The upward-slope lines indicate a
positive correlation between log(SoybeanSuitability) and the production of soybeans
across Brazilian states.
Additionally, we collect data on the size of soybean harvest area in Brazil from
BIGS for 1989 to 2010. We plot the average size of soybean harvest area in log
against log(SoybeanSuitability) in Figure 4.8. From Figure 4.7 and 4.8, we can
argue that the states marked as having more land considered suitable for cultivating
soybeans by the GAEZ project (or higher log(SoybeanSuitability)) are producing
more soybeans. Therefore, we can view the variable log(SoybeanSuitability) in this
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study as a valid proxy to measure land suitability for cultivating soybeans.
Figure 4.8: Soybean harvest area and soybean suitability
Lastly, there are two upward-slope lines in both Figures 4.7 and 4.8. The top line
represents average production amount and average size of harvest area after the GM
soybean cultivation was legalized (from 2003 to 2010) and the bottom line indicates
average production amount and average size of harvest area before the legalization
of GM soybean cultivation (from 1989 to 2002) in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 respectively.
These two upward-slope lines indicate that the production amount and harvest area
of soybeans have increased after GM soybean cultivation was legalized in 2003.
4.4.2 Land Conflict
Data on land conflicts is taken from Brazil’s Pastoral Land Commission (Comissao
Pastoral da Terra, CPT). CPT (2004) defines land-related conflicts as “collective
action by landless families or peasants that, by entering rural properties, claim
lands that do not fulfill the social function”.32 Since 1985, CPT has compiled in-
formation from all available sources and has published annual reports (Conflitos no
Campo) about land-related conflicts.33 These reports widely document the number
32The definition of land-related conflicts is directly translated by the study of Hidalgo et al.
(2010) from CPT (2004).
33The sources are local, national and international news articles, state and federal government
reports, reports from churches, rural unions, political party, NGOs, reports from CPT offices and
citizen depositions. For more details, please see Hidalgo et al. (2010).
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of conflicts, the number of family and people involved, hectares of affected area,
land-related murders, attempted murders, death threats and other disputes (water
and labor) at municipal, state and national levels in Brazil. As the land conflict data
is survey data, it may be subject to under-reporting. However, the conflict dataset in
this study is viewed as the most comprehensive by Albertus, Brambor and Ceneviva
(2016) and is used by many studies (see Alston, Libecap and Schneider 1996; Hi-
dalgo et al. 2010; Albertus, Brambor and Ceneviva 2016; Fetzer and Marden 2017).
The data collector, CPT, has widely considered all available sources and has sys-
tematically compiled reports since 1985. Therefore, the problem of under-reporting
in the conflict data is marginal.
4.4.3 Other Control Variables
The rainfall data is from INMET which belongs to the Ministry of Agriculture in
Brazil. INMET is the official meteorology statistics provider for other government
and research organizations, owns 270 weather stations across Brazil and records
daily precipitation from these stations. To construct log annual rainfall variable,
log(Rainfall), we first compute annual levels by summing up daily data for all
weather stations. In some states, there is more than one weather station.34 If
that is the case, we take the average of annual rainfall from all stations in the
same state. For the variable of log(Population) and the Gini coefficient, the data is
obtained from the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa
Economica Allicada, IPEA).35
4.5 Empirical Model
Our main identification strategy is to exploit a quasi-natural experiment based on
the legalization of GM soybean cultivation in 2003 by the Brazilian federal gov-
34All the states except Amapa have more than one weather states.
35Population data in IPEA is not year-wise and is only available in 1980, 1991, 1996, 2000, 200,
2010. Therefore, missing years during the observational period are interpolated.
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ernment, and then observe the impact of this policy on land conflicts for states
that own more suitable land for soybean cultivation vis-a-vis states that own less.
Empirically, to estimate the effect of this quasi-natural experiment, we adopt a
Difference-in-Differences (DD) approach and estimate:
yit = β1 log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · I
post
t + γ
′xit + ai + µt + εit (4.20)
This approach captures (if any) the difference in land conflict intensity between
states that have more suitable land for soybean cultivation versus states that have
less after GM soybean cultivation was legalized. The dependent variable yit repre-
sents one of the four conflict variables in their log form: the number of land conflicts
(log(Conflict)), the number of people (log(People)) and families (log(Family)) that
participated in conflicts and the area affected by land conflicts (log(Area)) in state
i and year t. log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) is the log size of suitable land for soybean
cultivation in state i (as determined by the GAEZ project). Ipostt is a dummy vari-
able that is equal to one for the years when GM soybean cultivation was legalized.
Thus, it takes the value of one from 2003 onward (i.e. from 2003 to 2015) and zero
if otherwise (i.e. from 1985 to 2002).
The vector xit is other control variables in state i and year t. We consider three
control variables in this study. The first one is log(Rainfall), which aims to control
the effects of economic conditions on land-related conflicts (Hidalgo et al. 2010).
The second one is log(Population), which controls the effect of population on land
conflicts (Dow, Mitchell and Reed 2017). The third one is the Gini coefficient, which
captures the effect of social grievance on land conflicts (Muller et al. 1989; Albertus,
Brambor and Ceneviva 2016). For the unobserved components of the model, ai is
the state fixed effect and µt is the year fixed effect. εit is the idiosyncratic error term
clustered at the state level.
β1 is the coefficient of interest and represents the impact of the interactive vari-
able between the land suitability for cultivating soybeans and years of legalization
on cultivating GM soybeans in Brazil on the dependent variables. Using one of the
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dependent variable log(Conflict) as an example, the estimated coefficient β̂1 is the
impact of GM soybean cultivation on the number of land conflicts. A negative β̂1
indicates that states with 1% more land that is suitable for cultivating GM soybeans
experience β̂1% fewer land conflicts after GM soybean cultivation was legalized in
2003.
4.5.1 Further Remarks
We argue that our main regressor – log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · I
post
t – is plausibly ex-
ogenous for two reasons. Firstly, the announcement of legalization of GM soybean
cultivation in 2003 is unexpected and therefore, the timing of implementing this pol-
icy, which is captured by Ipost in the empirical model, is plausibly exogenous (Bustos
et al. 2016). Secondly, climatic, land and soil characteristics in the physical envi-
ronment, which are used for measuring land suitability for soybeans cultivation as
reflected by log(SoybeanSuitability), are predetermined. The literature argues that
variation of these characteristics is exogenous and considers to be a good identifica-
tion strategy (see Carranza (2014) as an example). Our argument that the variable
log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · I
post
t in the empirical model is plausibly exogenous is not
new. Nunn and Qian (2011) made a similar argument when they interacted the
years of adopting potato cultivation with a variable that is constructed to measure
land suitability for cultivating potato under the same method as this study.
Nonetheless, there are two potentially confounding issues that we need to take
care of. The first one is omitted variable bias. The coefficient of interest is β1
and captures the impact of the interactive variable between log(SoybeanSuitabilityi)
and Ipostt on the dependent variables. If there are variables that are correlated
with the interactive variable and the dependent variable but are not controlled
for, β̂1 would be biased. For example, rainfall may be positively correlated with
log(SoybeanSuitabilityi). Moreover, rainfall as a proxy of income is negatively asso-
ciated with land conflicts (Hidalgo et al. 2010).36 So, β̂1 is overestimated. Population
36Hidalgo et al. (2010) argue that income rises when log(Rainfall) increases, income growth can
heighten the cost of participating in land invasion and then land conflicts reduce.
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growth can intensify resource scarcity, which leads to conflict outbreaks (Brückner
2010).37 Social grievance due to unequal land distribution can trigger land conflicts
(Albertus, Brambor and Ceneviva 2016).
To address the omitted variable bias issue, we add the control variables, namely
log(Rainfall), log(Population) and the Gini coefficient to control the effect of incomes
arising from weather variations, population and social grievance on land conflicts.
Additionally, we include state fixed effects (αi) to control all time-invariant state
level factors and unobserved permanent differences across states.38 We also include
year fixed effects (µt) to capture all time-varying macroeconomic factors such as na-
tional land reforms in Brazil (Alston, Libecap and Schneider 1996), and commodity
price shocks (Brückner and Ciccone 2010; Dube and Vargas 2013).39
The second potential threat is reverse causality. If the dependent variables in
this study (i.e. log(Conflict), log(People), log(Family) and log(Area)) are positively
or negatively associated with the interactive variable log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · I
post
t
in the empirical model above, β̂1 would either be overestimated or underestimated,
respectively. However, the construction of the variable, log(SoybeanSuitability), mea-
suring land suitability for cultivating soybeans in this study is time-invariantly based
on the climate, land and soil conditions of each state i in Brazil and is not directly as
a function of any dependent variable. Additionally, Ipostt is exogenous (Bustos et al.
2016). Therefore, reverse causality may not be a threat in our empirical model.
4.6 Main Results
In this section, we present the main results. To examine the inclusion of main control
variables on the estimated effect of GM soybean cultivation on land conflicts (β̂1),
we first present our estimates of the regression model without control variables in
37However, Dow, Mitchell and Reed (2017) argue that a bigger population can deter attacks in
land conflicts.
38These time invariant factors could be the quality of government institutes (Fearon and Laitin
2003) and the property rights (Fetzer and Marden 2017 ).
39Adding µt can also control the effect of financial crisis that could potentially has on land
conflict.
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Table 4.3, and then with control variables in Table 4.4.
4.6.1 Baseline Results without Control Variables
Table 4.3 presents the baseline regression results with state and year fixed effects but
without controls. We find that there is a negative association between GM soybean
cultivation and land conflicts. Specifically, Column (1) shows that states that are
more suitable for GM soybean cultivation have experienced fewer land conflicts after
the legalization of GM soybean cultivation in 2003, where a 1% increase in the size
of suitable land for GM soybean cultivation is associated with a 0.115% decline in
land conflicts on average.
Table 4.3: Baseline results without control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)




∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗ -0.117
(0.0528) (0.0310) (0.0516) (0.1090)
Observations 810 774 676 751
R-squared 0.278 0.327 0.249 0.100
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered in the state level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Additionally, Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4.3 show that states that are more
suitable for GM soybean cultivation experience a reduction in the number of people
and families participating in land conflicts. For instance, after the legalization of GM
soybean cropping, we find that a 1% increase in area of suitable land for GM soybean
cultivation is associated with a 0.170% and 0.136% decline in the number of people
and families participating in land conflicts on average respectively. However, GM
soybean cultivation is not statistically significant to the size of the areas affected
by land conflicts (measured by log(Area)). This suggests that while the number
of people and families affected by conflicts have declined with the legalization of
soybean cultivation, there is no evidence at this point that the area affected by land
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conflicts has declined.
4.6.2 Baseline Results with Control Variables
We explore the sensitivity of our baseline regression results to the inclusion of
control variables, namely, the log of rainfall (log(Rainfall)), the log of population
(log(Population)), and the Gini coefficient (Gini). Firstly, we add the rainfall vari-
able to control the effect of economic conditions due to weather changes on land
conflicts (Hidalgo et al. 2010). Secondly, we include the population variable to
control the impact of population on conflicts (Brückner 2010). Thirdly, the Gini
coefficient variable is added to control the effect of social grievance arising from land
inequality on land conflicts (Muller et al. 1989; Albertus, Brambor and Ceneviva
2016).
The estimation results with controls are reported in Table 4.4. In general, we find
that the sign and statistical significance of the treatment (i.e. log(SoybeanSuitabilityi)·
Ipostt ) are the same as what we have found in the baseline regression without controls
(see Table 4.3). As such, the mitigating effect that the legalization of GM soybean
cultivation has on land conflict incidence, and the number of people and families
participating in land conflicts is not driven by the effects of rainfall, population and
social grievance.
Interestingly, compared with the treatment, the effect of the controls appear to be
weak. For instance, rainfall, population and the Gini coefficient are all statistically
insignificant for conflict incidence. While the effect of rainfall on the four measures
of conflict has the expected negative sign, which is consistent with the literature that
rainfall is negatively associated with land conflicts (Hidalgo et al. 2010), this effect is
only statistically significant when conflict is measured by the number of participants.
Likewise, population and the Gini coefficient are only statistically significant when
conflict is measured by the area affected by land conflicts. These suggest that the
association of these controls and land conflicts, especially when it is measured by
conflict incidence, is weak.
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Table 4.4: Baseline results with control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)




∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.143
(0.0522) (0.0256) (0.0428) (0.1102)
log(Rainfall) -0.234 -0.751∗∗∗ -0.187 -0.234
(0.2767) (0.1267) (0.2741) (0.4369)
log(Population) -0.136 -0.367 1.167 -2.161∗∗
(0.4085) (0.7834) (0.7622) (0.8729)
Gini 1.071 2.383 -1.0632 6.558∗
(2.385) (2.8208) (1.9898) (3.5565)
Observations 774 743 662 722
R-squared 0.291 0.347 0.257 0.134
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered in the state level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.7 Robustness Checks
Our baseline results have shown that the legalization of GM soybean cultivation is
associated with a reduction in land conflicts. In this section, we conduct several
checks to investigate the robustness of these results.40
4.7.1 Placebo Test
The DD approach relies on the assumption that the pre-treatment trends (i.e. in
land conflicts) of the treatment and control groups (i.e. soybean cultivation suitable
versus less suitable states, respectively) are the same. If not, the deviation in land
conflicts between the soybean cultivation suitable and less suitable states after 2003
could be due to not only the legalization of GM soybean cultivation, but also other
confounding factors that we may not be aware of. To see if this assumption is
violated, we consider Waldinger (2010) and conduct a series of placebo tests.
In each placebo test, we keep only the pre-legalization period (1985 to 2002) and
40As the coefficient of interest, β1, is not statistically significant when the dependent variable is
log(Area) in the main results, robustness checks to the case of log(Area) is excluded in this section.
I also conducted the same robustness checks for the case of log(Area. The results are not shown
here. However, excluding the case of log(Area) do not affect our conclusion.
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randomly select a false treatment period. Then, we create a new treatment variable
by interacting the false treatment year with the suitability measure of soybean culti-
vation for each state (i.e. log(SoybeanSuitabilityi)). In principle, the false treatment
should not have any effect on conflicts. As such, we would expect the effect of this
treatment to be statistically insignificant, or has the wrong (positive) sign. If false
treatment is statistically significant and has the same negative sign as reported in
the baseline regressions, then what we believe to be the effect of the legalization of
GM soybean cultivation could be an artifact of an unobserved shock.
Table 4.5: Placebo test 1
(1) (2) (3)
log(Conflict) log(People) log(Family)
log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · I1993t 0.024 0.029 0.091∗∗
(0.0272) (0.0456) (0.043)
log(Rainfall) -0.420 -1.076∗∗∗ -0.268
(0.2981) (0.2149) (0.4179)
log(Population) -0.927 -1.034 0.322
(0.6420) (1.287) (1.318)
Gini -1.116 1.361 -1.721
(2.5162) (4.6626) (3.3580)
Observations 428 397 316
R-squared 0.178 0.325 0.225
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered in the state level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The first false treatment year is 1993. In this case, the false treatment can
be constructed as log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · I1993t , where I1993t is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one for the year 1993 (zero if otherwise). Using this new
interactive term as the main regressor, we estimate our model with the sample
from 1985 to 2002 (pre-legalization of GM soybean cultivation period). Table 4.5
shows that the estimated coefficient of the effects of log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · I1993t
on log(Conflict) and log(People) are statistically insignificant and very close to zero
(Columns (1) and (2)). Although log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · I1993t is statistically sig-
nificant for log(Family) in Column (3) Table 4.5, the sign of this effect is (positive)
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Table 4.6: Placebo test 2
(1) (2) (3)
log(Conflict) log(People) log(Family)
log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · I2000t 0.012 -0.012 -0.006
(0.0594) (0.1087) (0.0994)
log(Rainfall) -0.428 -1.083∗∗∗ -0.284
(0.2998) (0.2140) (0.4073)
log(Population) -0.963 -1.152 -0.005
(0.6498) (1.2480) (1.1784)
Gini -1.467 1.035 -3.052
(2.5287) (4.5737) (2.9888)
Observations 428 397 316
R-squared 0.176 0.325 0.217
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered in the state level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
wrong. This provides some support that our regression design does not erroneously
report the presence of a treatment effect where there is none.
The second false treatment year is 2000. We construct log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) ·
I2000t , where I
2000
t indicates that the year 2000 is one (zero if otherwise), and use it to
replace log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · It as the main regressor in the estimation. In Table
4.6, we find that the estimated coefficient of the effect of log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) ·
I2000t is not statistically significant for all our dependent variables and are close to
zero. This may suggest that the link between soybean cultivation and conflict reduc-
tion is weak before the policy of legalizing GM soybean cultivation was implemented
in 2003.
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Figure 4.9: False treatment year on log(Conflict)
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 present the results of the placebo test based on the false
treatment years of only 1993 and 2000 respectively. In order to check the com-
mon trend assumption completely, we hypothesize that each year in the period of
pre-legalization of GM soybeans (1985 to 2002) is a false treatment year and false
treatment variables are created by interacting the log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) with these
false treatment years. We then summarize the estimated coefficients of these false
treatment variables on log(Conflict), log(People) and log(Family) and their corre-
sponding confidence intervals in the Figures 4.9, 4.10 and 4.12 separately.
In the Figure 4.9, the x-axis represents the period of pre-legalization of GM soy-
beans and the y-axis represents the estimated coefficients of the interactive variable
between log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) and the false treatment year moving from 1986 to
2002 when the dependent variable is log(Conflict). These estimated coefficients are
represented by dots between two solid lines in the Figure 4.9. The top and the bot-
tom solid lines in the Figure 4.9 are the upper and lower bounds of corresponding
confidence intervals of these estimates.
Three results are observed in the Figure 4.9. Firstly, if log(SoybeanSuitabilityi)
interacts with the false treatment years from 1988 to 2002, the estimated coefficients
are positive. This suggests that the cultivation of soybeans on log(Conflict) in the
treatment groups were not already on a downward trend before the legalization of
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GM soybean cultivation. Secondly, the estimated coefficient is negative when the
false treatment year is 1987, but is statistically insignificant as zero is included in
its confidence intervals. This demonstrates that the effect of soybean cultivation is
not statistically associated with log(Conflict) before 2003. Thirdly, these estimated
coefficients are close to zero. This indicates that the effect of soybean cultivation on
log(Conflict) is very small before 2003.
Figure 4.10: False treatment year on log(People)
In Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.12, we plot the estimated coefficients of log(SoybeanSuit-
abilityi) interacted with false treatment years from 1985 to 2002 when the the depen-
dent variables are log(People) and log(Family). These estimated coefficients have
the positive sign or are close to zero or are statistically insignificant (except the
estimated coefficient when the false treatment year is 2002). Generally, the results
that can be observed in the dependent variable log(Conflict) in Figure 4.9 can also
be found in the dependent variable log(People) and log(Family) in Figure 4.10 and
Figure 4.12 respectively.
To summarize, the placebo tests in this section show that the impact of soybeans
cultivation in the pre-legalization of GM soybean cultivation is very small and not
statistically significant on the dependent variables (i.e. log(Conflict), log(People)
and log(Family)). The cultivation of soybeans in the treatment groups were not
already on a downward trend before 2003 (or the pre-legalization of GM soybeans).
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This suggests that the common trend assumption may not be violated in our DD
estimation.
Figure 4.11: False treatment year on log(Family)
Figure 4.12: False treatment year on log(Area)
4.7.2 Confounding Factors in the Estimation of the Effects
of GM Soybean Cultivation on Conflicts
In the main results section above, we suggest that states owning a greater size of
suitable land for cultivating GM soybeans are negatively associated with land con-
flicts after GM soybean cultivation was legalized in 2003. This indicates that states
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with land that is suitable for cultivating only soybeans should get the treatment
effect because of policy change in 2003.
However, states with land that is suitable to cultivate soybeans could be also
suitable to grow other crops when GM soybean cultivation was legalized in 2003.
It is important to know that the cultivation of other crops does not confound the
estimation of the effects of GM soybean cultivation on the dependent variables in
the empirical model. To determine this, we select some staple crops that are not
genetically-modified. These non-GM crops are cassava, coffee and wheat. Since they
are non-GM crops, the policy change in 2003 should not have affected the regions
that are suitable to cultivate these non-GM crops and the reduction of land conflicts
should not be linked to the cultivation of these non-GM crops. If so, we may argue
that other factors (i.e. the cultivation of other non-GM crops) do not confound the
effect of GM soybean cultivation on land conflicts after GM soybean cultivation was
legalized in 2003.
To this end, we extract data about land suitability for cultivating these non-
GM crops mentioned above (cassava, coffee and wheat) from the FAO’s GAEZ
project. We use the same way as section 4.4.1 above to define land that is suit-
able for cultivating these non-GM crops,41 and create three new variables in log
form: log(CassavaSuitabilityi), log(CoffeeSuitabilityi) and log(WheatSuitabilityi) to
approximate cultivation suitability for these non-GM crops in each state i. Then,
we interact these three variables with the dummy variable Ipostt . So, three new in-
teractive variables log(CassavaSuitabilityi) · I
post





t are created and included in our empirical model.
The inclusion of these three new variables in the empirical model can cap-
ture the fact that regions that are suitable for cultivating GM soybeans could
also be suitable for cultivating these non-GM crops when GM soybean cultiva-
tion was legalized in 2003. The related information about the estimated coefficient
of log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · I
post
t in the empirical model with the new variables of








Ipostt is helpful to explore the potential threat of confounding effects in the estimation
of the impact of GM soybean cultivation on the dependent variables.
Table 4.7: Checking confounding factors in the empirical model
(1) (2) (3) (4)




∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.105** -0.108
(0.0651) (0.0303) (0.0498) (0.1163)
log(CassavaSuitabilityi) · I
post
t 0.006 0.041 -0.048 -0.196





(0.0366) (0.0287) (0.0230) (0.0349)
log(WheatSuitabilityi) · I
post
t 0.001 -0.011 0.013 -0.004
(0.0221) (0.0211) (0.0193) (0.0276)
log(Rainfall) -0.214 -0.709∗∗∗ -0.175 -0.217
(0.273) (0.1308) (0.2803) (0.4249)
log(Population) -0.290 -0.091 -0.941 -2.205∗∗
(0.419) (0.6686) (0.7691) (0.9449)
Gini 0.925 1.879 -1.373 5.757∗
(2.309) (2.816) (1.895) (3.4122)
Observations 774 743 662 722
R-squared 0.306 0.356 0.267 0.138
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered in the state level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Firstly, we estimate our empirical model with these three new interactive vari-
ables and show the estimation results when the dependent variable is log(Conflict)
in Column (1) Table 4.7. As we can see, the estimated coefficient of log(Soybean-
Suitabilityi) · Ipostt is -0.122 and remains statistically significant at 10% level when






itabilityi) · Ipostt are not statistically significant at any conventional level. Addition-
ally, GM soybean cultivation is still negatively associated with log(Conflict) as the
baseline results above suggest (see Column (1) Table 4.4). Therefore, the results in
Column (1) Table 4.7 show that among soybeans, cassava, coffee and wheat, only
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the cultivation of soybeans can reduce the number of land conflicts after the policy
of legalizing GM soybean cultivation was implemented in 2003.
Secondly, we apply the same strategy as above and add the variables of log(Cas-
savaSuitabilityi) ·Ipostt , log(CoffeeSuitabilityi) ·I
post
t and log(WheatSuitabilityi) ·I
post
t
to conduct robustness checks for the second dependent variable log(People). Re-
sults are presented in Columns (2) Table 4.7. They show that the estimated effect
of log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · I
post
t on log(People) is -0.147 and is statistically sig-





t are not statistically significant at any conventional level.
Even though the estimate of log(CoffeeSuitabilityi) · I
post
t is statistically significant,
the sign is (positive) wrong. This indicates that, even though the states with land
that is suitable for cultivating GM soybeans could also be the states with land that
is suitable for planting other non-GM crops, only the cultivation of soybeans reduces
the number of people that participated in land conflicts after GM soybeans cultiva-
tion was legalized in 2003. So, our results in this exercise align with what we find
in the main results section above (see Column (2) Table 4.4 above).
Thirdly, we include log(CassavaSuitabilityi) · I
post
t , log(CoffeeSuitabilityi) · I
post
t
and log(WheatSuitabilityi) · I
post
t in the empirical model when the dependent vari-
able is log(Family) and present the new results in Column (3) Table 4.7. As we
can see, the estimated coefficient of log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · I
post
t is -0.105 and re-
main statistically significant at 5% level as the baseline results suggest (see Col-





t are not statistically significant at any conventional level.
The estimate of log(CoffeeSuitabilityi) · Ipost is statistically significant at 5% level
with the wrong (positive) sign.
To summarize, this section explores some potential confounding factors that may
challenge the estimation of the impact of GM soybean cultivation on the dependent
variables in the empirical model. In particular, we consider the fact that states that
are suitable for cultivating soybeans could also have land that is suitable for cultivat-
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ing other non-GM crops when GM soybeans were legalized in 2003. We added three
new interactive variables: log(CassavaSuitabilityi) ·I
post
t , log(CoffeeSuitabilityi) ·I
post
t
and log(WheatSuitabilityi) · I
post
t to the empirical model and find that, as the main
results section suggests, the estimated coefficient of log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) · I
post
t is
negative and remains statistically significant. This indicates that only soybean cul-
tivation has a negative association with land conflicts after GM soybean cultivation
was legalized in 2003.
4.7.3 Alternative Definitions of Land Suitability
In Section 4.4.1 above, we construct a variable, log(SoybeanSuitabilityi), to define
the size of land that is suitable to cultivate soybeans in state i. According to the
FAO’s GAEZ project, land in each state is categorized into eight land classes on
the basis of what percentage of the land in each state can achieve the estimated
maximum yield for the crop in question. In our baseline regressions, land is defined
as suitable for soybean cultivation if it can achieve 40% or above of maximum yield
of the soybean crop as estimated by the GAEZ project (see Section 4.4.1 for details).
As discussed, the selection of this 40% cut-off point, while it follows a similar
approach as Nunn and Qian (2011), is nonetheless arbitrary. Therefore, we check
if our conclusions are robust to using different cut-off points to construct the defi-
nition of suitable land for soybean cultivation. To this end, we will create two new
suitability variables by adjusting the cut-off point from land that can achieve above
40% of maximum yield to land that can achieve above 55% or 25%. Then, we es-
timate the effect of GM soybean cultivation on the dependent variables with these
new suitability variables and access its result sensitivity.
First Alternative Definition of Land Suitability
In this section, we use a different cut-off point to define land that is suitable for
cultivating soybeans. The new cut-off point is land that can achieve 55% or above
of the maximum yield estimated by the GAEZ project. Then, we re-estimate the
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effect of GM soybean cultivation (β̂1) on log(Conflict), log(People) and log(Family)
with this new suitability variable and present the results in Table 4.8 below. As
Table 4.8 shows, our conclusions in the main result sector above are not sensitive
to the change of cut-off point in log(SoybeanSuitabilityi). Specifically, the sign, size
and significant levels of β̂1 on log(Conflict), log(People) and log(Family) in Table
4.8 are similar to what Table 4.4 suggests in the main result section above when the
cut-off point is 40% or above .
Table 4.8: First alternative definition of land suitability
(1) (2) (3) (4)




∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.141
(0.0521) (0.0258) (0.0428) (0.1094)
log(Rainfall) -0.236 -0.754∗∗∗ -0.191 -0.238
(0.2772) (0.1259) (0.2746) (0.4378)
log(Population) -0.123 -0.357 1.175 -2.146∗∗
(0.4107) (0.6749) (0.7640) (0.8761)
Gini 1.047 2.281 -1.115 6.527∗
(2.3977) (2.8022) (1.9943) (3.556)
Observations 774 743 662 722
R-squared 0.290 0.348 0.257 0.133
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered in the state level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Second Alternative Definition of Land Suitability
We further check the main results in terms of the selection of cut-off point in the con-
struction of the suitability variable for soybean cultivation or log(SoybeanSuitabilityi).
The cut-off point for log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) here is land that can achieve 25% or
above of the maximum yield estimated by the FAO’s GAEZ project. The results
are presented in Table 4.9 below. Once again, β̂1 (which denotes the estimated co-
efficient of GM soybean cultivation on log(Conflict), log(People) and log(Family) is
statistically significant in Table 4.9. The results here still suggest that states with
a greater area of land that is suitable for cultivating GM soybeans experience fewer
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land-related conflicts after the GM soybean cultivation was legalized in 2003.
Table 4.9: Second alternative definition of land suitability
(1) (2) (3) (4)




∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗ -0.323∗∗
(0.0509) (0.0249) (0.0420) (0.1638)
log(Rainfall) -0.228 -0.743∗∗∗ -0.189 -0.243
(0.2738) (0.1285) (0.2747) (0.4298)
log(Population) -0.030 0.531 1.277∗ -1.829∗
(0.4250) (0.6943) (0.7688) (1.0829)
Gini 1.136 2.436 -1.135 5.890∗
(2.3020) (2.7094) (1.9337) (3.363)
Observations 774 743 662 722
R-squared 0.291 0.347 0.260 0.132
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered in the state level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Overall, through this exercise, our main results are not sensitive to the selection
of the cut-off point that is used to define log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) in the DD estima-
tion. As the cut-off point in log(SoybeanSuitabilityi) is to determine whether land is
suitable for cultivating soybeans. In the main results, we select that land is suitable
to crop soybean if land can achieve 40% or above of the maximum yield. We have
varied the cut-off point from 40% to 55% and 25% above here. We find that the
variations of this cut-off point slightly change the size of β̂1 but do not change the
sign and significance level of β̂1. Therefore, our findings on the negative association
between GM soybean cultivation and log(Conflict), log(People) and log(Family) in
the main results section remain robust.
4.7.4 Alternative Suitability Variable: 2020s
In our baseline results, we use the FAO’s data on soybean suitability for the years
1960 to 1990 to construct our measure of soybean suitability (i.e. log(SoybeanSuitabi-
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lity)).42 One concern is that land invasions could be driven not only by the historical
productivity of a piece of land, but also expectations about its future productivity.
As a robustness check, we choose measures of land suitability for soybean cultivation
projected to the 2020-2029 period by the FAO. We re-estimate our model with our
new land suitability index for soybean cropping and present our new results in Table
4.10. We find that β̂1 (the estimated coefficient of log(SoybeanSuitability) · Ipostt ) is
still statistically significant on log(Conflict), log(People) and log(Family) even when
the variable, log(SoybeanSuitability), to measure the soybeans cultivation suitability
is for the 2020-2029 period.








log(Rainfall) -0.237 -0.754∗∗∗ -0.189
(0.2780) (0.1274) (0.2743)
log(Population) -0.118 0.398 1.192
(0.4109) (0.6766) (0.7608)
Gini 1.094 2.420 -1.031
(2.3843) (2.850) (1.9960)
Observations 774 743 662
R-squared 0.291 0.346 0.257
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered in the state level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.8 Conclusion
This study has examined the effect of GM soybean cultivation on land conflicts
in Brazil. We argue that the legalization of GM soybean cultivation in 2003 in
Brazil has remarkably improved agricultural productivity in terms of land and labor
use efficiency. The agricultural productivity enhancement induced by GM soybean
42There are four time periods. They are 1960-1990, 2020-2029, 2050-2059 and 2080-2089. 1960-
1990 is the baseline time period.
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cultivation can not only reduce soybean price but also land value. A devaluation of
land in return can result in a reduction of land conflicts. We employ a difference-
in-differences estimation and explore two sources of variation. This first source of
variation is the commercial legalization of GM soybean cultivation in 2003 in Brazil
and the second source of variation is the cross-sectional differences in the size of
land that is suitable for cultivating soybeans. Our study has found that states
that are more suitable for cultivating GM soybeans tended to experience fewer land
conflicts and fewer people and families participated in conflicts after cultivation
of GM soybeans was legalized in 2003. Our findings remain robust after placebo
tests, confounding factors and different measures of land suitability and functional
forms of variable were taken into account in the estimation. The discussion about
the legalization of GM crop cultivation is one of the most debated questions for
policy makers and the effect of agricultural innovation arising from the GM soybean
cultivation on economic development is still scarce. This study can provide some
insight into this controversial crop and its impact on internal conflict reduction.
104
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Mikhail Golosov, Aleh Tsyvinski and Pierre Yared. 2012. “A dynamic
theory of resource wars.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(1):283–331.
Albertus, Michael, Thomas Brambor and Ricardo Ceneviva. 2016. “Land inequality
and rural unrest: theory and evidence from Brazil.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
p. 0022002716654970.
Alston, Lee J, Gary D Libecap and Robert Schneider. 1996. “The determinants and
impact of property rights: Land titles on the Brazilian frontier.” The Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 12(1):25–61.
Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck, Peter Sandholt Jensen and Christian Volmar Skovsgaard.
2016. “The heavy plow and the agricultural revolution in Medieval Europe.” Journal
of Development Economics 118:133–149.
Axbard, Sebastian. 2016. “Income Opportunities and Sea Piracy in Indonesia: Evidence
from Satellite Data.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8(2):154–194.
Barrows, Geoffrey, Steven Sexton and David Zilberman. 2014a. “Agricultural biotechnol-
ogy: the promise and prospects of genetically modified crops.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 28(1):99–120.
Barrows, Geoffrey, Steven Sexton and David Zilberman. 2014b. “The impact of agricul-
tural biotechnology on supply and land-use.” Environment and Development Economics
19(6):676–703.
Benthem, Leander Van. 2013. “SOYBEAN AND MAIZE PRODUCTION IN BRAZIL.”
Department of Business Economics, Wageningen University and Research Center .
Brookes, Graham and Peter Barfoot. 2015. “Environmental impacts of genetically modified
(GM) crop use 1996–2013: Impacts on pesticide use and carbon emissions.” GM crops
& food 6(2):103–133.
Brückner, Markus. 2010. “Population size and civil conflict risk: Is there a causal link?”
The Economic Journal 120(544):535–550.
105
Brückner, Markus and Antonio Ciccone. 2010. “International commodity prices,
growth and the outbreak of civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa.” The Economic Journal
120(544):519–534.
Bustos, Paula, Bruno Caprettini, Jacopo Ponticelli et al. 2016. “Agricultural Productivity
and Structural Transformation: Evidence from Brazil.” American Economic Review
106(6):1320–1365.
Canavari, Maurizio and Rodolfo M Nayga Jr. 2009. “On consumers’ willingness to purchase
nutritionally enhanced genetically modified food.” Applied Economics 41(1):125–137.
Carranza, Eliana. 2014. “Soil endowments, female labor force participation, and the de-
mographic deficit of women in India.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
6(4):197–225.
Cerdeira, Antonio L and Stephen O Duke. 2006. “The current status and environmental
impacts of glyphosate-resistant crops.” Journal of Environmental Quality 35(5):1633–
1658.
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. “On economic causes of civil war.” Oxford economic
papers 50(4):563–573.
CPT. 2004. “Conflitos no Campo (Goiania:comissao Pastoral da Terra,1988-2004).”
Comissao Pastoral da Terra Nacional Brasil .
CPT. 2014. “Conflitos no Campo.” Comissao Pastoral da Terra Nacional Brasil .
Dow, Gregory K, Leanna Mitchell and Clyde G Reed. 2017. “The economics of early
warfare over land.” Journal of Development Economics 127:297–305.
Dube, Oeindrila and Juan F Vargas. 2013. “Commodity price shocks and civil conflict:
Evidence from Colombia.” The Review of Economic Studies 80(4):1384–1421.
Emerick, Kyle, Alain de Janvry, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Manzoor H Dar et al. 2016. “Tech-
nological innovations, downside risk, and the modernization of agriculture.” American
Economic Review 106(6):1537–61.
FAO. 2005. “FAO Statistical Yearbook (New York, United Nations, 2005).” FAO Statis-
tical Yearbook .
FAO. 2013. “World food and agriculture.” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, Rome p. 2013.
Fearon, James D and David D Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war.” Amer-
ican political science review 97(1):75–90.
Fetzer, Thiemo and Samuel Marden. 2017. “Take what you can: property rights, con-
testability and conflict.” The Economic Journal 127(601):757–783.
106
Gaskell, George, Martin W Bauer, John Durant and Nicholas C Allum. 1999. “Worlds
apart? The reception of genetically modified foods in Europe and the US.” Science
285(5426):384–387.
Girardi, Eduardo Paulon. 2015. “DATALUTA-Banco De Dados Da Luta Pela Terra.”.
Gollin, Douglas. 2010. “Agricultural productivity and economic growth.” Handbook of
agricultural economics 4:3825–3866.
Gollin, Douglas, Stephen Parente and Richard Rogerson. 2002. “The role of agriculture
in development.” The American Economic Review 92(2):160–164.
Grossman, Herschel I. 1994. “Production, appropriation, and land reform.” The American
Economic Review 84(3):705–712.
Hammond, John L and Federico M Rossi. 2013. “Landless workers movement (MST)
Brazil.” The Wiley-Blackwell encyclopedia of social and political movements .
Hartl, Jochen and Roland Herrmann. 2009. “Do they always say no? German consumers
and second-generation GM foods.” Agricultural Economics 40(5):551–560.
Hidalgo, F Daniel, Suresh Naidu, Simeon Nichter and Neal Richardson. 2010. “Economic
determinants of land invasions.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 92(3):505–523.
Huang, Jikun, Carl Pray and Scott Rozelle. 2002. “Enhancing the crops to feed the poor.”
nature 418(6898):678–684.
Huang, Jikun, Ruifa Hu, Carl Pray, Fangbin Qiao and Scott Rozelle. 2003. “Biotechnology
as an alternative to chemical pesticides: a case study of Bt cotton in China.” Agricultural
Economics 29(1):55–67.
Huang, Jikun, Ruifa Hu, Hans van Meijl and Frank van Tongeren. 2004. “Biotechnol-
ogy boosts to crop productivity in China: trade and welfare implications.” Journal of
Development Economics 75(1):27–54.
Huang, Jikun, Ruifa Hu, Scott Rozelle, Fangbin Qiao and Carl E Pray. 2002. “Transgenic
varieties and productivity of smallholder cotton farmers in China.” Australian Journal
of Agricultural and Resource Economics 46(3):367–387.
IBGE. 2006. “Censo Agropecuario 2006.” Rio de Janeiro:IBGE .
Iyigun, Murat, Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian. 2015. “Agricultural productivity and con-
flict: evidence from the diffusion of potatoes to the old world.” University of Colorado
Boulder,Yale University, and Northwestern University working paper.
James, Clive. 2015. Global status of commercialized biotech/GM crops: 2015. International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA) Ithaca.
107
James, Clive et al. 2010. Global status of commercialized biotech/GM crops: 2010. Inter-
national Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA) Ithaca.
Jia, Ruixue. 2014. “Weather shocks, sweet potatoes and peasant revolts in historical
China.” The Economic Journal 124(575):92–118.
Johnston, Bruce F. 1951. “Agricultural productivity and economic development in Japan.”
Journal of Political Economy 59(6):498–513.
Johnston, Bruce F and John W Mellor. 1961. “The role of agriculture in economic devel-
opment.” The American Economic Review 51(4):566–593.
Kassie, Menale, Bekele Shiferaw and Geoffrey Muricho. 2011. “Agricultural technology,
crop income, and poverty alleviation in Uganda.” World Development 39(10):1784–1795.
Matsuyama, Kiminori. 1992. “Agricultural productivity, comparative advantage, and eco-
nomic growth.” Journal of economic theory 58(2):317–334.
Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti. 2004. “Economic shocks and civil
conflict: An instrumental variables approach.” Journal of political Economy 112(4):725–
753.
Motavalli, PP, RJ Kremer, Min Fang and NE Means. 2004. “Impact of genetically modi-
fied crops and their management on soil microbially mediated plant nutrient transfor-
mations.” Journal of environmental quality 33(3):816–824.
Muller, Edward N, Mitchell A Seligson, Manus I Midlarsky et al. 1989. “Land inequality
and political violence.” American political science Review 83(2):577–596.
Nunn, Nathan and Nancy Qian. 2010. “The Columbian exchange: A history of disease,
food, and ideas.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(2):163–188.
Nunn, Nathan and Nancy Qian. 2011. “The potato’s contribution to population and urban-
ization: evidence from a historical experiment.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
126(2):593–650.
Powell, Robert. 1993. “Guns, butter, and anarchy.” American Political Science Review
87(1):115–132.
Qaim, Matin. 2003. “Bt cotton in India: Field trial results and economic projections.”
World Development 31(12):2115–2127.
Qaim, Matin. 2009. “The economics of genetically modified crops.” Annu. Rev. Resour.
Econ. 1(1):665–694.
Qaim, Matin and David Zilberman. 2003. “Yield effects of genetically modified crops in
developing countries.” Science 299(5608):900–902.
108
Qaim, Matin and Greg Traxler. 2005. “Roundup Ready soybeans in Argentina: farm level
and aggregate welfare effects.” Agricultural economics 32(1):73–86.
Ravallion, Martin and Shaohua Chen. 2007. “China’s (uneven) progress against poverty.”
Journal of development economics 82(1):1–42.
Robles, Wilder. 2018. “Revisiting Agrarian Reform in Brazil, 1985–2016.” Journal of
Developing Societies 34(1):1–34.
Rocha, Pedro J and Vı́ctor M Villalobos. 2013. Comparative study of genetically modified
and conventional soybean cultivation in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Inter-
American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA).
Self, Sharmistha and Richard Grabowski. 2007. “Economic development and the role of
agricultural technology.” Agricultural Economics 36(3):395–404.
Sharma, HC, JH Crouch, KK Sharma, N Seetharama and CT Hash. 2002. “Applica-
tions of biotechnology for crop improvement: prospects and constraints.” Plant Science
163(3):381–395.
Tobin, James. 1950. “A statistical demand function for food in the USA.” Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General) 113(2):113–149.
Tolley, George S, Yi Wang and RG Fletcher. 1969. “Reexamination of the time series
evidence on food demand.” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society pp. 695–
705.
Trigo, Eduardo J and Eugenio J Cap. 2004. “The impact of the introduction of transgenic
crops in Argentinean agriculture.”.
USDA. 2012. “Brazil:Agricultural Biotechnology Annual.” Washington,DC:United States
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service .
USDA. 2016. “Brazil:Agricultural Biotechnology Annual.” Washington,DC:United States
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service .
Van Driel, Hans, Venuta Nadall and Kees Zeelenberg. 1997. “The demand for food in the
United States and the Netherlands: a systems approach with the CBS model.” Journal
of Applied Econometrics pp. 509–523.
Waldinger, Fabian. 2010. “Quality matters: The expulsion of professors and the conse-
quences for PhD student outcomes in Nazi Germany.” Journal of Political Economy
118(4):787–831.





This dissertation has explored the relationship between agriculture, income and
conflicts. There are five chapters in this dissertation. Chapters one and two are
the introduction and overview respectively. Chapter three and four are the main
studies. Chapter five is the conclusion of this dissertation. The purposes and results
of these five chapters are presented as below.
In the first chapter, we provided extensive information on conflicts. In particular,
we presented statistics on the number of armed conflicts, information regarding their
geographic distribution, variations in conflict frequencies and the number of battle-
related deaths. All of this information is imperative to understanding the severity
and impact of conflicts.
The overview is a summary of the related literature on the link between agri-
culture, income and conflicts. Specifically, we discussed reasons to study conflicts,
the methods used to estimate the effect of income on conflicts, potential issues in
the prevailing estimation methods in the literature and the role of agriculture in the
occurrence of conflicts.
In the first main study, we thoroughly examined the claim about the negative
relationship between rainfall shocks and conflicts in Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti
(2004) by considering: 1) new rainfall and conflict datasets in their estimation, 2)
extended observational years, 3) more lagged rainfall variables, 4) cross-sectional
dependence, 5) different functional forms of rainfall. In this main study, we found
that the statistical significance in estimating the effect of rainfall shocks on con-
110
flicts vanished in Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) when the revised rainfall
and conflict datasets were implemented. This indicates that the negative associ-
ation between rainfall shocks and conflicts are not robust in their study. Results
remain the same even though larger sample years and more lagged rainfall shocks
variables were considered. However, we found that the effect of rainfall on con-
flicts is indeed statistically significant after cross-sectional dependence and different
functional forms of rainfall were taken into account even though the statistical sig-
nificance in the estimation is relatively weaker than Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti
(2004). The implication of this chapter is that shocks in the agriculture sector are
associated with conflict incidence. Therefore, better development in the agriculture
sector could contribute to a reduction of conflicts.
Lastly, we further explore the role of agriculture on conflict and investigated
the effect of productivity-enhancing innovation in agriculture on conflicts. Specifi-
cally, we exploited the event of legalization of Genetically-Modified (GM) soybean
cultivation in Brazil and argued theoretically that the enhancement of agricultural
productivity induced by GM soybean cultivation can reduce land prices and then
mitigate land conflicts. Empirically, we have employed DD estimation and found
that states that own more land that is suitable for cultivating GM soybeans after
the legalization was negatively associated with land conflicts. We conducted a series
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